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The CSIS Proliferation Prevention Program successfully concluded its PASCC Grant N00244-
14-1-0034 on September 4, 2015 with a roll-out event reporting on the results of the Track II 
Dialogue on Limiting Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (NSNW).  PPP hosted the first Track II 
dialogue in Vienna, Austria in October 2014, and a second Track II dialogue in Washington, 
D.C. in June 2015.  The first session, in which 7 Russian, 1 European and 10 U.S. experts 
participated, produced a set of topics for potential collaboration.  A similar group (6 Russians, 2 
Europeans and 12 U.S. experts) met in Washington, D.C. at CSIS headquarters and 
recommended specific action items.  The specific details are found in the attached individual 
workshop reports).  Following each session, senior fellow Sharon Squassoni briefed U.S. 
government officials on the results. 
 
Although Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and official allegations of INF Treaty 
violations created significantly more tension in the discussions than originally anticipated, the 
shutdown of most avenues for discussion (such as the NATO-Russia Council) made this Track II 
effort even more important.  Although the original work plan envisaged drafting the text of an 
actual agreement, it was obvious before the first meeting in October that that kind of progress 
would not be possible.  Instead, the parties focused on political and technical confidence-
building measures over the course of two sessions, while still discussing important issues like 




PASCC Quarterly Progress Report 1 
October 2014 (ending Sept. 30, 2014) 
 
Project Execution 
In the first quarter, CSIS completed all the relevant milestones for the first Track II workshop on 
Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons, inviting participants to the first workshop, assigning discussion 
papers, reviewing them, and disseminating them to participants.  CSIS also reviewed draft 
briefing slides from the four speakers, who were Jeffrey McCausland, Nancy Jo Nicholas, 
Eugene Miasnikov, and Evgeny Buzhinsky.  The milestones for the next quarter include drafting 
the conference report from the first workshop in Vienna, circulating it among participants, 
revising and then posting it on the CSIS website.  
 
Scheduling conflicts did not allow all the proposed invitees to participate in the Track II dialogue 
(e.g., Arbatov, Khlopkov, Orlov, Topychkanov, Zagorski, Brooks, and Hoffman).  CSIS secured 
additional Russian participants (Eugene Miasnikov and Sergey Utkin).  Other European and 
NATO experts subsequently invited included Oliver Meier, Guy Roberts, and Steven Pifer.  In 
light of Amy Gordon’s conflicting commitments, CSIS opted to commission two additional 
discussion papers for the meeting and engage Jeffrey McCausland as a consultant.  CSIS 
requested approval from NPS to shift funds slightly to accommodate this change. 
 
Key achievements: The October dialogue established a baseline understanding of key issues 
related to NSNW, including the current role of NSNW for the United States, Europe and Russia 
and the role of monitoring associated with unilateral withdrawals or confidence-building 
measures (CBMs).  Participants in the workshop expressed their appreciation for the productive 




Total PASCC Project Funding 212,986$ 
Balance as of [end of quarter] 181,761$ 
 
Actual costs have largely been in line with the proposal budget, with the exception of consultant 
and honoraria costs.  This is because Amy Gordon was not available for consulting.  In addition 
to his honoraria, CSIS paid Jeffrey McCausland a consulting fee for guidance that he provided 
on the project.  Finally, two additional discussion papers are planned for the June workshop, 
which will increase honoraria costs.  CSIS will manage the difference by using the extra funding 







PASCC Quarterly Progress Report 2 
January 2015 (ending December 31, 2014) 
Project Execution 
CSIS held the first Track II workshop on Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons on October 6th and 7th 
at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Nonproliferation in Vienna, Austria.  From the 
workshop proceedings, CSIS drafted the conference report, circulated it to participants for their 
review, and posted it on the CSIS website.  Following its publication, CSIS included the report 
as a part of its quarterly e-mail update to its global mailing list. CSIS also secured the date and 
location of the follow-up Track II workshop on Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons, which will be 
held at CSIS headquarters on June 4-5th, 2015.   
 
CSIS will draft a preliminary agenda, invitations, and a working background document outlining 
the key topics of discussion for the second Track-II workshop, and will circulate those among 
workshop participants.  CSIS will also identify the authors of discussion papers for the second 
workshop.  CSIS will also seek to secure additional Russian participants (Alexei Arbatov, Anton 
Khlopkov, Andrei Zagorski, Sergei Rogov), as well as additional American participants for the 
second workshop in Washington, D.C. 
 
Problems encountered: In light of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and alleged violations of the 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, CSIS is evaluating how to best implement the second 
dialogue.  The original plan to develop a verification approach for non-strategic nuclear weapons 
may no longer be useful.  CSIS is exploring other approaches that could yield fruitful dialogue 
on non-strategic nuclear weapons, including building trust between the United States and Russia 
and/or a focus on broader principles that could guide a verification approach.   
 
Key achievements: The dialogue established a baseline understanding of key issues related to 
NSNW, including the current role of NSNW for the United States, Europe and Russia and the 
role of monitoring associated with unilateral withdrawals or confidence-building measures 
(CBMs).  Participants in the workshop expressed their appreciation for the productive and 
valuable dialogue, and their interest in the follow-up workshop.  CSIS published the first 
conference report after circulating it for review among workshop participants.  
   
Financial Reporting 
Total PASCC Project Funding 212,986$ 
Balance as of [end of quarter] 108,922$ 
 
Conference costs in Vienna were slightly higher than anticipated because of the need for 
simultaneous interpretation on technical nuclear issues.  However, CSIS managed these costs by 
securing alternate funding for CSIS flights to Vienna and hosting the second workshop at CSIS 




PASCC Quarterly Progress Report 3 
April 2015 (ending March 31, 2015) 
Project Execution 
In the third quarter, CSIS confirmed the date and location of the second Track II workshop and 
invited additional U.S. and Russian participants.  Additional U.S. invitees include David 
Hoffman, James Fuller, Jeffrey Mankoff, and Paul Schwartz.  Additional Russian invitees 
include Petr Topychkanov, Vladimir Orlov, and Victor Esin. CSIS drafted a preliminary agenda, 
invitations, and a working background document outlining the key topics of discussion for the 
second Track-II workshop.  These will be circulated among workshop participants in advance of 
the conference.  CSIS has identified the discussion leaders for the second workshop. 
 
Two weeks before the second workshop, CSIS will circulate all the materials for the meeting.  
Following the workshop, CSIS will draft the second conference report and circulate it among 
participants for their review.  This report will then be posted on the CSIS website and included as 
part of the CSIS quarterly e-mail update to its mailing list.   
 
Problems encountered: Due to recent turmoil in the U.S.-Russian relationship over Ukraine and 
alleged violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, CSIS has decided not to 
pursue very specific discussions on a verification approach for non-strategic nuclear weapons, 
but to build on the recommendations from the October workshop in four areas: military doctrinal 
issues, transparency mechanisms and approaches, developments in verification technology, and 
safety and security collaboration.     
 
Course alterations: Instead of drafting a verification approach, CSIS will collect and 
disseminate discussion papers on a broader scope of issues regarding NSNW.   
  
Key achievements: Virtually all of the participants in the first workshop are ready to participate 
and contribute to the second workshop.  
  
Outreach and USG Communication 




Total PASCC Project Funding 212,986$ 
Balance as of [end of quarter] 100,667$ 
 
Actual costs are in line with the proposal budget, with the exception of consultant and honoraria 
costs since Amy Gordon was not available for consulting.  Instead of procuring two discussion 
papers for the June workshop as mentioned in the prior update, CSIS will seek a broader scope of 
discussion papers and discussion leaders, which will increase honoraria costs.  CSIS will manage 
this difference by using the extra funding from not hiring a consultant. 
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PASCC Quarterly Progress Report 4 
July 2015 (ending June 30, 2015) 
 
Project Execution 
In the third quarter, CSIS held the second Track II workshop on Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons 
at CSIS headquarters on June 4-5th, 2015.   A workshop report was circulated to all participants. 
After incorporating comments from participants, CSIS will post the report on the CSIS website, 
include a link in the PPP quarterly program update email.  CSIS will hold a roll-out event 
summarizing the results of the workshop in early September 2015. 
  
Key achievements:  The participants identified specific measures for follow-up during the one 
and one-half days of discussion, all of which are incorporated in the final workshop report.    
  
Outreach and USG Communication 
 Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control & Verification Frank Rose gave the 
luncheon address at the workshop and DOE/NNSA’s Greg Dwyer gave the dinner address.  A 





Total PASCC Project Funding $212,986 
Balance as of June 30, 2015 $41,526 
 
 
Actual costs are in line with the proposal budget.  There are still some travel expenses 
outstanding as well as honoraria costs.  CSIS anticipates spending budgeted funds for the roll-out 




Washington Workshop Summary 
June 4-5, 2015 
 
On June 4 and 5, 2015, the Proliferation Prevention Program of the Center for Strategic & 
International Studies hosted U.S., European and Russian experts at a closed workshop entitled, 
“Track-II Dialogue on Limiting Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons.” Appendix A contains the 
agenda and list of participants. The workshop was the second of two dialogues that aimed to 
analyze the core issues regarding potential future limits on non-strategic nuclear weapons, 
including verification, transparency, and confidence-building measures. 
At the first workshop held in Vienna, Austria in October 2014, experts identified four baskets of 
issues where further collaboration would be useful: military doctrinal talks, specific transparency 
measures, development of verification technology and the safety and security of non-strategic 
nuclear weapons (NSNW).  Participants further identified specific ideas in those baskets which 
became the focus of discussion at the Washington workshop (see Appendix B).  Given the 
shrinking opportunities for official dialogue on nuclear weapons issues, participants also focused 
on identifying discussion topics for future Track-II dialogues. They agreed that the opportunity 
to discuss these issues has a renewed value in the current political environment. 
Against the backdrop of the crisis in Ukraine, disputes regarding the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces (INF) Treaty and ballistic missile defense (BMD), sanctions on Russia and increasingly 
negative media coverage of West-Russia relations, experts agreed that: 
 The United States and Russia need a new basis for collaboration and transparency, given 
that tensions are as high as they were during some of the darkest years of the Cold War. 
o The need to reduce risks of unintended escalation, through increased attention to 
transparency and confidence-building measures regarding military exercises, 
crisis communications, crisis management, and agreed rules of military conduct 
when military forces of one side operate in proximity to military forces of the 
other, was a common thread of discussion. 
o A whole new generation of officers, officials and political leaders needs 
education in “nuclear messaging.” They also need to be re-educated on the 
benefits of maintaining a dialogue on arms control in times of increased tension 
so that cooperation on the crucial issue of nuclear security is not held hostage to 
fluctuations in the overall relationship. 
 Transparency measures are needed to “debunk” myths and soothe irritants in the 
relationship. For example: 
o Military doctrinal talks could help at the government level to build confidence 
through enhanced transparency and improved understanding. 
 U.S. participants called for clarification of the status and relevance of the 
Russian policy of “de-escalation” (i.e., use of non-strategic nuclear 
weapons in a conventional conflict to de-escalate the conflict). 
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 Russian participants called for explanations of “countervailing” measures 
that the U.S. is considering in response to Russian violation of the INF 
Treaty. 
 
 Nonetheless, for real progress, there needs to be a political umbrella under which to 
organize such efforts. Establishment of that umbrella would likely require an 
improvement in the broader political atmospherics. 
 
In particular, some short-term actions are critically needed to ease tensions.  Participants 
recommended that: 
1. U.S., NATO and Russian military officers and policy makers should meet to 
review implementation of current agreements designed to avoid misunderstandings 
and unintended crises, such as the Incidents at Sea agreement. 
2. Governments should seek to expand the Vienna Document’s confidence-building 
measures to include exchanges of information regarding non-strategic nuclear 
weapons, high-precision conventional weapons and air and missile defense. 
3. Russian experts should publish articles on the concept of de-escalation, how it 
would operate and whether or not it is part of official Russian doctrine. 
4. In order to remove potential disagreements with respect to the INF Treaty, the 
U.S. government should consider transparency measures to demonstrate that the 
MK-41 missile launcher for Aegis Ashore SM-3 missile interceptors cannot contain 
or launch “offensive” surface-to-surface missiles. 
5. NATO and Russian governments should reconvene joint activities regarding the 
safety and security of nuclear weapons or exchange such collaboration to include an 
exchange of best practices 
6. The U.S. and Russia should consider reconvening the Special Verification 
Commission under the INF Treaty for formal consideration of allegations of treaty 
violations. 
 
Over a longer horizon, many of the activities that were conducted usefully by the NATO-Russia 
Council should resume, including military-to-military exchanges on avoiding misunderstandings.  
Participants also recommended resuming U.S.-Russian activities related to developing better 
technologies for verification, and recommended a new review of classification issues regarding 
nuclear warheads. 
 
Military Doctrinal Issues 
Discussion leaders: Dr. Jeffrey McCausland, Distinguished Visiting Professor of Research and 
Minerva Chairholder at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College; Lt. Gen (ret) 
Evgeny Buzhinsky, Chairman of the Executive Board at the PIR Center; Dr. Guy Roberts, former 
Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Weapons of Mass Destruction in NATO 
 
Dr. McCausland explored some of the basic differences between U.S. and Russian military 
doctrine, defining U.S. military doctrine as “principles that guide the employment of U.S. 
military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective,” compared to Russia’s broader 
approach to doctrine as essentially a national military strategy. Dr. McCausland stressed both 
nations’ interest in stability as a common ground for resuming official discussions and for 
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continuing Track-II talks, and suggested improving the Vienna Document and Open Skies Treaty 
as well as the Incidents at Sea and similar agreements. 
 
Gen. Buzhinsky focused on the evolution of the roles of non-strategic nuclear weapons in 
military doctrine. He emphasized the two primary roles of nuclear weapons in Russian military 
doctrine: “in response to the use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) against Russia or its allies” and “in response to aggression [against Russia] with the use 
of conventional weapons in case the existence of the State is under threat.” Buzhinsky disputed 
any role for the use of nuclear weapons in a “de-escalation” effort in a conflict with a nuclear-
armed state or alliance, emphasizing that this term is not used in official Russian military 
documents. Gen. Buzhinsky stressed that, unlike the United States, Russia does not consider 
using nuclear weapons to protect its allies in a conventional conflict. 
 
Calling the development of high-precision weapons and Prompt Global Strike (PGS) by the U.S. 
and its allies the biggest concern for Russia and its military, Gen. Buzhinsky stressed the 
importance of NSNW in maintaining Russia’s security. Gen. Buzhinsky described this reality as 
problematic for negotiating future reductions in NSNW, especially considering the various 
threats Russia faces due to its size, length of borders, and hostile neighbors.  In particular, Russia 
sees NSNW as “an instrument to neutralize NATO superiority in general-purpose forces,” an 
approach similar to that adopted by NATO in the past. 
 
Dr. Roberts focused on NATO’s Strategic Concept as the guide for NATO’s military posture. 
The three “core tasks” of the Strategic Concept are collective defense, cooperative security, and 
crisis management.  In that context, land-based nuclear weapons in Europe are considered by 
NATO as a critical element in the overall deterrence posture to preserve peace and to prevent 
war or any kind of coercion. The 2012 Defense and Deterrence Posture Review stated that all 
allies share “risk and responsibility” in nuclear deterrence, hence the “nuclear sharing 
arrangements” that place nuclear weapons in European territories, and the “consultative 
arrangements” between the U.S. and NATO, both of which demonstrate the important collective 
roles that members of NATO have in maintaining a strong deterrence posture.  
 
According to Dr. Roberts, the rise of conventional capabilities in NATO has not eliminated the 
need for a nuclear deterrent, and therefore nuclear weapons will remain an integral part of 
NATO’s overall defense posture. Dr. Roberts suggested there should be no reduction of nuclear 
stockpiles in NATO unless accompanied by reciprocity from Russia, and suggested that NATO 
seek as a first step that Russia withdraw its NSNW away from the NATO-Russia border.  
 
Participants discussed their concern with the increase of serious incidents involving U.S., 
Russian and NATO militaries in and over the Baltic and Black Seas.  Some of these incidents 
involved aircraft and ships, including the flight by a Russian pilot over a U.S. destroyer last year, 
something that President Putin had later criticized.  Since the Ukraine crisis began, almost 40 
potentially dangerous incidents involving Russian and Western militaries have been documented 
(according to the European Leadership Network). Participants agreed about the need “to get 
serious” about the Incidents at Sea agreement (dating from 1972) but also noted that it is limited 
in its applications.  Russian participants discussed their experience trying to conclude an 
agreement between Russia and NATO on submarine rescue after the Kursk submarine accident, 
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only to be told by NATO authorities that Russia would have to conclude bilateral agreements 
with individual countries and an umbrella agreement with NATO.  (Countries “release” their 
national assets to NATO operations.) In the week following the workshop, U.S. and Russian 
naval officers (Vice-Admiral Oleg Burtsev and Rear Admiral John Nowell) met in Naples to 
discuss exactly this.  Participants suggested however that the discussions should include not just 
the U.S. and Russian naval staffs, but all services and NATO as well.   
 
On de-escalation, U.S. participants suggested that most American experts (including those with 
long government experience and those within the U.S. government itself) have accepted as 
conventional wisdom that Russian doctrine calls for escalation to nuclear weapons use in order to 
keep a conflict from escalating.  In fact, some participants saw little difference between this 
concept and NATO’s “flexible response” doctrine of the 1970s and 1980s. Some U.S. 
participants suggested the recent Russian military simulation regarding an invasion of 
Kaliningrad as evidence that Russian military experts are considering the use of tactical nuclear 
weapons to defend against such an invasion. Indications that such weapons could be used in the 
context of a potential conflict in Kaliningrad raised questions of whether Russia’s actual 
threshold for use of nuclear weapons was something lower than cases in which the very 
existence of the Russia state was at risk.  Russian participants reiterated that de-escalation is not 
a part of official military doctrine, although some military publications first introduced the idea 
about fifteen years ago.  One observer suggested that there is no need for a concept of de-
escalation because no nation on Russia’s border can conventionally defeat, or even threaten 
Russia. U.S. participants suggested that an unclassified publication on de-escalation from a 
credible Russian scholar could help ease the confusion on the American side.  
 
A broader question is whether doctrine is absolute in terms of how/when/why nuclear weapons 
would be used.  Although the decision to use nuclear weapons is political, their employment 
would follow doctrine.  In response to a question about the type of attack that would threaten the 
survival of the Russian state (specifically if a conventional attack on Russian command and 
control by US systems and NATO would amount to such a threatening level), Russian 
participants suggested that the response would depend on the effectiveness of the attack. These 
participants made clear, though, that Russia will respond appropriately if the fate of the state is at 
stake.  
 
Another question participants considered was the role of military simulations and exercises and 
what lessons could be drawn from them.  For instance, U.S. participants asked for clarification 
regarding reports of coercive (rather than reactive) Russian military exercises vis-à-vis NATO.  
Russian participants questioned the reliability of information relating to the simulations given the 
generally restricted access to such simulations.  Although participants disagreed on the accuracy 
of press reports and what could be learned from open sources, all agreed on the need for further 
talks to clear up misunderstandings in these substantive areas.  In addition, the obvious confusion 
about “nuclear messaging” (especially regarding Putin’s statements and those of other officials 
regarding nuclear weapons and Crimea) evoked particular concern that there is a current lack of 
experience in processing and understanding these messages.   
 
One of the fundamental issues regarding NSNW is how to define them: Are they defined by their 
purpose? By their range? By what they are not (i.e., not strategic)? Are they defined by treaties 
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(e.g., everything not covered by START I/New START)?  One Russian expert suggested that 
militarily-speaking, NSNW are theater-of-war weapons.  An American expert suggested that all 
nuclear weapons are strategic since the decision to use nuclear weapons would have to be a 
strategic one. 
 
Transparency Benefits and Costs 
Discussion leaders: Dr. Eugene Miasnikov, Director of the Center for Arms Control, Energy and 
Environmental Studies, and Dr. Sergey Rogov, Director of the Institute for the U.S. and 
Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Science. 
 
Dr. Miasnikov used the historical context of nuclear reductions in the early 1990s and the 
Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI), in particular, to make three essential points regarding 
previous limitations on NSNW: 1) both sides agreed their nuclear arsenals at the time were 
excessive; 2) Russia was interested in ensuring irreversibility of the reductions, envisaged by the 
START treaty; and 3) Russian leaders at the time had a vision for their integration into the West.  
The U.S.-Russian dialogue on limiting nuclear arsenals was a means for Russia to enter into 
“institutions” following the fall of the Soviet Union. Transparency was essentially viewed as the 
price of admission for Russian integration into new institutions, and not a “new value of 
democracies.”  Today, these conditions don’t necessarily apply, and it will be essential to find 
new reasons, or a new basis, for transparency measures. Russia currently does not see 
transparency as a plus but a concession. 
 
Dr. Miasnikov suggested that even at their height, transparency measures did not exceed more 
than the PNI and lab-to-lab research work.  Although Americans may view transparency as a 
value intrinsic to democratic societies, Russians doubt the value of transparency for national 
security.  At worst, transparency is viewed as a Trojan horse.  The recent order signed by 
President Putin on state secrets might severely limit the ability of Russian officials to talk about 
transparency measures on facilities associated with nuclear weapons. 
 
Nonetheless, Dr. Miasnikov noted that there are some indications that Russian officials (quoting 
a Ministry of Defense official who said that future arms control should be based on confidence-
building measures and national technical means rather than inspections) might be interested in 
development of remote sensing technologies. In addition, he suggested future limitations should 
distinguish between deployed and non-deployed warheads. Transparency about conventional 
weapons and sea-launched cruise missiles would also be welcomed by Russia. Finally, Dr. 
Miasnikov suggested the U.S. and Russia declare they will not develop new types of non-
strategic nuclear weapons in order to improve the environment for discussions. 
 
Dr. Rogov suggested that while many transparency measures are possible, the current conditions 
in this “new Cold War” make even discussions on transparency difficult. A potential starting 
point, however, is to talk about strategic stability.  Defining this as a stable balance of overall 
military potential, including both offensive and defensive weapons, measures to improve 
strategic stability (such as arms control) would take into account a range of systems.  Rogov 
identified six baskets of issues that have an impact on strategic stability: NSNW, INF, ballistic 
missile defenses (BMD), high precision conventional weapons, cyber and space.  Rogov also 
identified five pillars upon which future strategic stability could rest (see attached paper): treaty 
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obligations; confidence-building/transparency measures; unilateral parallel measures; 
cooperative security and defense (based on reciprocal political and legal commitments); and 
development of political and economic cooperation between Russia and the United States.   
 
On NSNW, there are great asymmetries between the U.S. and Russian arsenals: the U.S. has one 
class of NSNW (air-delivered bombs), while Russia has three classes, including air defense 
systems, naval nuclear weapons, and short-range systems. Russian short-range, tactical nuclear 
weapons number about 2,000, but fewer than 500 tactical nuclear weapons could ever be used in 
Europe. Thus, one needs to consider which classes of NSNW are being discussed when looking 
at the balance of capabilities between Russia and the United States.  
 
Dr. Rogov stressed that if we consider NSNW to be everything less than strategic, then counting 
the three nuclear states in NATO (the UK, France and the U.S.) would greatly diminish Russia’s 
perceived “superiority.”  Dr. Rogov argued for inclusion of French and British forces in any 
negotiation on NSNW reductions. Nonetheless, a new treaty for Europe would be much more 
complicated than the old NATO/Warsaw Pact paradigm.   
 
On INF, Dr. Rogov noted that accusations of violations from both sides were unaccompanied by 
real dialogue.  This could put not only the INF Treaty but also arms control as a whole at risk in 
the very near future.  Dr. Rogov concluded by voicing a concern about what Secretary of 
Defense Ashton Carter meant by his use of the term “countervailing measures” in discussing 
how the U.S. will respond to Russia’s INF Treaty violation. He interpreted this as meaning a 
prevailing strike capability, something he considers very worrisome.  
 
Participants explored the dilemmas of definitions.  Oversimplifying was dangerous, given the 
tremendous variety of nuclear-tipped weapons possessed by the U.S. and Russia. During SALT I 
negotiations, the U.S. defined strategic weapons basically as all intercontinental weapons, while 
Russians defined them as weapons that could hit the Russian homeland from wherever they were 
based. These approaches are irreconcilable: if the United States were to accept the Russian 
definition, U.S. systems for defense of its allies would be constrained, while Russian systems 
that could threaten those allies would not be constrained.  Eventually, if countries move towards 
lower numbers of nuclear weapons, then all types of nuclear weapons must be addressed. In that 
case, strategic nuclear weapons could be constrained under a sub-limit within broader limits on 
overall weapon stockpiles. 
 
One participant stated that New START only limits about 35-40% of U.S. and Russian nuclear 
arsenals, and that percentage could continue to decrease in the future. Another participant noted 
the reliance of treaties on counting delivery vehicles rather than warheads, although New 
START counts both deployed delivery vehicles and deployed warheads (albeit with a discount 
for bomber weapons). 
 
Russian participants questioned what levels of transparency on military matters would be 
acceptable for both Russia and the United States. U.S. participants countered that this is a 
political issue. Participants discussed possible transparency on missile defense capabilities, 
aimed at demonstrating the “technical differences” that make the MK-41 launcher unable to 
launch cruise missiles. Such intrusive steps would be important for verifying new limits and 
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providing confidence. In the words of one participant, “a return to national technical means of 
verification [alone] is a terribly frightening prospect for the entire international community.” 
 
One potentially useful suggestion for transparency related to the current conflict in Ukraine was 
to focus on exercises of crisis communication and agreed codes of military conduct, as both of 
these will have immediate benefits and reduce the likelihood of unintended escalation. 
Classification of information presents an issue, but past examples, such as the PNIs, show what 
is possible if the United States takes the lead in negotiations. 
 
Technology Development  
Discussion leaders: Dr. James Fuller, Former Director of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Programs at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and Nancy Jo Nicholas, Associate 
Laboratory Director at Los Alamos National Laboratory. 
 
Dr. Fuller opened the third session with a presentation on monitoring and verification of nuclear 
warheads.  He noted this focus was appropriate given the dual-capability of delivery vehicles, 
especially for shorter ranges, and emphasized the importance of establishing a clear definition of 
NSNW, with “unequivocal observables and/or measureable parameters,” for establishing 
credible verification abilities.  Fuller supported the definition of NSNW by exclusion, meaning 
that if the weapon is not covered by New START, then it is non-strategic.  
 
Dr. Fuller described some accomplishments in the development of verification technologies, 
including: understanding different parties’ “sensitive and non-sensitive information categories,” 
development of attribute measurement technologies, recognition of the importance of templates, 
and “the need for information barrier procedures and technology for most verification 
technology.” Templates allow for warhead differentiation by using the high-resolution energy 
spectrum of the contained warhead, and these approaches are currently the only way to 
differentiate between types of warheads. 
 
Some suggestions offered by Dr. Fuller that apply to verification include dismantling old 
facilities and designing new ones with consideration of possible future inspections, identifying 
signatures other than radiation for use in templates, formal investigation of methods for making 
secure declarations (such as hash algorithms and zero-knowledge systems) and creating a 
standardized, unclassified warhead test object.  In addition, Dr. Fuller briefed the group on some 
of the recent suggestions emanating from the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s study Innovating 
Verification: New Tools & New Actors to Reduce Nuclear Risks, released in July 2014. 
 
Ms. Nicholas presented additional ideas for collaboration on verification technology, focusing on 
those areas of particular interest from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review 
Conference. She suggested the U.S. and Russia revive joint development work on measurement 
technology, revive the Warhead Safety and Security Exchange (WSSX)1, and potentially, 
                                                 
1 WSSX is described by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory as an “agreement [that] allows U.S. and Russian 
scientists who have expertise to design and produce nuclear weapons to work together under laboratory-to-
laboratory contracts to better understand and enhance the safety and security of nuclear weapon dismantlement in 




collaborate in responding to concerns about the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.  
Additional ideas included demonstrating global resilience to nuclear explosions and visit to labs 
to dispel myths about nuclear weapons and reassure allies.  The U.S. and Russia should also 
carefully consider how they would recover from a potential use by terrorists of a nuclear weapon. 
  
One participant questioned whether U.S.-Russian collaboration on demonstrating lower levels of 
impact of nuclear weapons could be a slippery political slope vis-à-vis non-nuclear weapon 
states.  Others thought that such a conversation is necessary if nuclear weapons are to exist in the 
future, because otherwise, if every use of a nuclear weapon is bad, then the only answer is to get 
rid of them. Ms. Nicholas suggested that the P-5 is looking to move away from a one-
dimensional approach regarding the use of nuclear weapons, and instead is considering scenarios 
in which the use of a small weapon in a certain area would not amount to a globally horrific 
detonation. Thus, getting scientists involved in these discussions would make certain parties’ 
views seem less self-serving. 
 
One participant concluded that the main issue is not the number of weapons or yield of these 
weapons, but the targeting of them. He said that the current situation in Southeast Asia between 
India and Pakistan presents a great risk for use of nuclear weapons; another participant suggested 
that a U.S.-Russian group meet with representatives from India and Pakistan at a Track-II level 
to discuss how NATO and the Warsaw Pact maintained stability during the Cold War, when both 
the U.S. and USSR had enormous nuclear stockpiles, and what lessons could be applied to the 
current conflict in Southeast Asia to avoid catastrophe.  Finally, with respect to classification, 
some participants suggested that the United States and Russia need to address their classification 
standards relating to warheads. Differences between what these countries consider to be sensitive 
information makes communication between these parties difficult. 
 
Safety & Security Collaboration Related to NSNW 
Discussion leader: Dr. Oliver Meier, Deputy Head of International Security Research Division 
at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs 
 
Dr. Meier said that cooperation on the safety and security of nuclear weapons may not seem 
intuitively the easiest area for U.S., Russian and NATO states to work on at the moment, but part 
of the appeal could lie in the fact that this work would not have direct implications on nuclear 
postures (that is, numbers, locations, or nuclear doctrine).  Rather than directly addressing 
strategic stability, such work could support crisis stability and tap into global interest in reducing 
the risks of nuclear accidents/incidents.  Both the United States and Russian Federation 
supported UNSCR1540 that outlines the unique responsibilities both countries have with respect 
to the safety and security of nuclear weapons. Against the backdrop of conflict in Ukraine, 
moreover, it may be wiser to consider confidence-building measures (CBMs) that address shared 
concerns but do not directly affect nuclear postures.  For nuclear weapon states, improving safety 
and security of NSNW should be desirable to avoid unwanted political attention that 
accompanies incidents.  For non-nuclear weapon states in particular, there is widespread concern 





Dr. Meier noted that in the past, CBMs in these areas focused on responses to nuclear security 
threats and on consequence management. For example, Russia and NATO from 2004 to 2007 
conducted joint exercises “related to nuclear weapon accident response field exercises.”2 In an 
environment where transparency regarding weapons, locations and doctrines may not be so 
politically easy, CBMs on safety and security could have some advantages.   
 
Dr. Meier suggested a few topics: security, accident/incident consequence management, joint 
assessment of terrorist threats and nuclear weapons safety.  One participant suggested it may be 
possible for the U.S. and Russia to help other countries on ensuring personnel reliability.  
Participants advocated renewed talks between NATO and Russia on avoiding unintended 
escalation, especially in avoiding nuclear escalation.  Under the present circumstances, existing 
mechanisms under the NATO-Russia Council are unlikely to return to business as usual, but 
given the serious need to avoid escalation, meetings could take the shape of military-to-military 
discussions. Another useful alternative would be Track-II level discussions. The participants 
largely agreed that discussions, at some level, on military matters and the Incidents at Sea 
agreement are crucial in light of the current dangers in international relations. 
 
On balance, collaboration on safety and security is not “low-hanging fruit” but a topic that 
deserves serious consideration.  Three specific hurdles to such collaboration would need to be 
overcome: classification, vulnerabilities, and politics. Safety and security of nuclear weapons are 
related to highly sensitive issues of nuclear weapons deployments and practices.  Further, no 
country likes to show weaknesses in its own posture.  Finally, all sides would need to explore 
this in a venue that is somewhat protected from politics. 
 
One participant called for the establishment of a principle that countries that possess nuclear 
weapons have responsibilities for maintaining safety and security. For established nuclear 
weapon states, such responsibilities help to reassure allies of safety and security, yet for 
proliferating countries, the issue becomes more problematic. By helping weapon-holding states 
improve their safety and security, one participant worried that we could inadvertently be helping 
them develop better weapons. Another participant noted that it is important for states to avoid 
giving the impression of a “nuclear club,” where nuclear states help each other while isolating 
non-nuclear states.  The potential development of guidelines for helping countries improve 
security, while retaining appropriate distancing from the nuclear programs in order to prevent 
improvement of weapon capabilities, could be helpful. A Russian participant noted that it may be 
easier for countries to assist in this security aspect by improving personnel reliability in nuclear 
programs, rather than working on aspects of the countries’ nuclear programs themselves. 




                                                 
2 From NATO website: “Between 2004 and 2007, experts and representatives from NRC countries also observed 
four nuclear weapon accident response field exercises, which took place in Russia and each of the nuclear weapon 
states of NATO (France, the United Kingdom and the United States). As a follow-on to these exercises, in June 
2011, NRC countries participated in a tabletop exercise dealing with emergency response to a nuclear weapon 
incident. Such activities increased transparency, developed common understanding of nuclear weapon accident 
response procedures, and built confidence that the nuclear weapon states were fully capable of responding 
effectively to any emergency involving nuclear weapons.” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50090.htm?  
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A World Without Tactical Nuclear Weapons? 
(Discussion leader: Dr. Nikolai Sokov, Senior Fellow at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and 
Non-Proliferation  
 
Dr. Sokov assessed that the deadlock in nuclear negotiations between the U.S. and Russia is the 
result of domestic politics within the United States and Russia. He asserted that in the current 
domestic environments, no one wants to be constructive, so in the end, it is easier to just blame 
others for lack of progress. He noted, though, that discussions surrounding NSNW have been 
stalled for the past fifteen years.  Dr. Sokov suggested that the U.S. will not have a monopoly on 
high-precision conventional weapons forever and that recognition of this fact could spur a more 
cooperative U.S. approach.  Both parties need to increase transparency.  In light of this, Dr. 
Sokov suggested extending the Vienna Document to include tactical nuclear weapons, 
“conventional strike weapons with theater ranges” and air/missile defense systems. He stated that 
once a transparency regime for “high-precision conventional and air/missile defense” capabilities 
is created, then tactical nuclear weapons could be eliminated. 
 
Russia’s official position on NSNW negotiations is that if conventional and missile defense 
capabilities are included in discussions, then Russia is willing to talk about NSNW. However, 
many of the participants expressed their doubts that arms control is on the agenda of either 
Washington or Moscow policymakers. In this case, improving transparency and establishing 
confidence-building measures become especially important. This could present an opportunity 
for extending the Vienna Document and enhancing Open Skies to expand transparency because 
there is likely to be little focus on it.  One of the drawbacks to less attention to arms control in 
the U.S. context is the lack of expertise on Capitol Hill, which can lead to Congress following 





Russian participants suggested that the collapse of the INF Treaty may be imminent, which 
would make even the implementation of New START difficult.  A total collapse of the arms 
control regime would mean the end of any rules of the game.  Unfortunately, thinking about and 
supporting crisis stability is fairly foreign to this generation of leaders.  And yet, crisis may be 
the “new normal” in many arenas (e.g., climate, cyber, space). It will become increasingly 
important to anticipate developments that could facilitate collaboration.  Crises can provide 






TRACK-II DIALOGUE ON LIMITING NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
 
Agenda 
Thursday, June 4, 2015 
 
1:30 p.m. – 1:45 p.m. Introductions; Recap of October discussion 
 Sharon Squassoni, Director and Senior Fellow, Proliferation 
Prevention Program, CSIS 
 
1:45 p.m. – 3:15 p.m. Session I: Military Doctrinal Issues 
What are the issues of concern that relate to NSNW?  What are the 
issues of concern more broadly? 
Discussion leaders:  
Jeffrey McCausland, Colonel, U.S. Army (ret.) 
Evgeny Buzhinsky, Chairman of the Executive Board, PIR Center 
Guy Roberts, former Deputy Assistant Secretary General for 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy, NATO  
 
3:15 p.m. – 3:30 p.m. Break 
 
3:30 p.m. – 5:00 p.m. Discussion 
 
5:00 p.m. – 6:30 p.m. Light Reception (9th Floor Balcony) 
 





Friday, June 5, 2015 
 
9:00 a.m. – 10:30 a.m. Session II: Transparency Pros and Cons  
Discussion leaders:  
Eugene Miasnikov, Director, Center for Arms Control, Energy 
and Environmental Studies 
Sergey Rogov, Director, Institute for US and Canadian Studies of 
the Russian Academy of Sciences 
 
10:30 a.m. – 10:45 a.m. Break 
 
10:45 a.m. – 12:15 p.m. Session III: Technology Development  
Discussion leaders: 
James Fuller, former Director of Defense Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Programs, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory  
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Nancy Jo Nicholas, Associate Laboratory Director, Los Alamos 
National Laboratory 
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12:30 p.m. – 1:45 p.m. Lunch 
 
1:45 p.m. – 2:45 p.m. Session IV: Safety & Security Collaboration Related to NSNW 
Discussion leader: Oliver Meier, Deputy Head of Research 
Division, International Security, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik 
 
2:45 p.m. – 3:00 p.m. Break 
 
3:00 p.m. – 4:00 p.m. Session V: A World Without Tactical Nuclear Weapons? 
Discussion leader: Nikolai Sokov, Senior Fellow, James Martin 
Center for Nonproliferation Studies 
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Anya Loukiyanova, Program Officer, Stanley Foundation 
Jeffrey Mankoff, Deputy Director, Russia and Eurasia Program, CSIS 
Jeffrey McCausland, Colonel (Ret.), U.S. Army  
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Eugene Miasnikov, Director, Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies  
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Steven Pifer, Director, Brookings Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative  
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Discussion Paper: Next Steps Regarding Limits on Non-
Strategic Nuclear Weapons (NSNW) 
 
Participants were asked to contribute a few ideas for further steps related to limiting non-strategic 
nuclear weapons (NSNW) in four areas: military doctrinal talks, transparency, technology 
development, and safety/security. The resulting compendium attempts to limit redundancy but should 
be reviewed to ensure nuances have not been lost. The bold text is the idea; the plain text describes 
what it would cover and the italicized text is the rationale. (Please note that commentary provided 
from participants was used to the extent possible, but the focus was on the specific ideas/steps 
themselves.)  
 
Additional discussion of these should focus on prioritization, identification of venues and scope. One 
participant suggested that these transparency and confidence-building measures should be aimed first 
at avoiding unintended crisis escalation and second, on reestablishing conditions for substantive talks 
on increased transparency and confidence.  
 
A general question is whether these activities/discussions would most usefully be conducted solely 
between the US and Russia, the US, Russia, NATO; or whether there are benefits to broadening 
these, in some cases, to include China and/or Asian allies (e.g., Japan, South Korea). A second 
question is whether (where not already delineated) these activities/discussions should take place on 
the Track I or Track II level. In addition, an important question is what role, if any, multilateral 




Military Doctrinal Talks 
 
The NATO Russia Charter signed in 1997 calls for discussions on military doctrine. It could be 
useful to discuss the continued validity of that document, but it is also abundantly clear that doctrinal 
discussions could help respond to some of the questions and concerns arising from the crisis in 
Ukraine. For example, many in the West believe that Russia now openly considers the use of nuclear 
weapons in any scenario in which it begins to lose to a superior force and that the Russian leadership 
has allegedly embraced a concept of “de-escalation” in which Russia would threaten to use nuclear 
weapons during a local conflict in order to deter an opponent from pursuing further military gains. 
These concerns need to be addressed. On the other hand, Russia needs clarity on U.S. policy on 
extended deterrence and NATO’s notion of “restoring deterrence.”  
 
1. Doctrinal evolution on the roles, missions, and objectives of non-strategic nuclear weapons. 
Questions to consider include what role do NSNW play in respective military strategies and 
how do existing trends in the development of military doctrine and force posture likely affect 
the potential for conflict and use of NSNW or SNW in a future conflict?  
 
Specific issues to cover could include: (i) conditions under which NSNW are likely to be used; and 
(ii) whether existing military balances (and imbalances) in both conventional forces and NSNW are 
creating greater incentives for conflict or the use of nuclear weapons in a future conflict, (iii) whether 
efforts to upgrade NSNW capabilities, including pursuit of cleaner, low-yield NSNW as well as 
modernization of existing weapons, such as B61 bombs, will increase incentives for further 
development or use of NSNW, and (iv) what specific measures could be taken either unilaterally or 
jointly with respect to force posture or otherwise to alter existing trends and reduce incentives for 
conflict or the use of nuclear weapons. 
  
An important first step would be to clarify how the Russian de-escalation concept and the escalation 
strategies of the US and NATO’s are similar and how they differ.  
 
2. Linkage between NSNW and other weapon systems and how changes in one category could 
affect the other. Specific issues to cover could include:  
 
(i) the impact of BMD on the role of nuclear weapons including NSNWs in Russian and US/NATO 
military doctrine; Is the relevance of ballistic missile defense more of a problem in the NSNW 
context? Less of a problem? Or is its relevance equal no matter what? Could de-coupling these issues 
be advantageous? Would greater transparency or technical verification intrusiveness reduce concerns 
on either or both sides?   
 
There is a definite interaction between transparency and possible reductions of nuclear forces 
including NSNWs and development of modern high precision conventional weapons or conventional 
military technologies in general as well as other issues involve air and missile defenses, space, and 
cyber. In the Russian view, any discussion on NSNWs should be accompanied by appropriate 
discussions on Prompt Global Strike concept, weaponization of outer space and high precision 
conventional weapons. In the long term, discussions on weapons based on other physical principles 
could also be included in the bilateral arms control agenda. But the most important issue for Russia 
is of course the U.S. Global BMD system. A U.S. refusal to reconsider its BMD plans for Europe in 
the context of closing the Iranian nuclear file would be interpreted by the Russian military as 
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evidence that the European Phased Adaptive Approach program is directed at deterring Russia. How 
do other global or regional security developments interact with these issues?  
 
(ii) how strategic conventional weapons (their development and deployment) will affect NSNW 
doctrine and the potential for use of NSNW, and  
 
(iii) whether increasing conventional military capability will eventually lead to reduced reliance on 
NSNW.  
 
3. The role of NSNW reductions in nuclear force/nuclear deterrence asymmetries. Is it even 
possible to decouple nonstrategic nuclear weapons reductions from strategic weapons reductions 
(why) given the differences in deterrence doctrine amongst the NWS?  
 
4. Current state of conventional arms control agreements. This would provide information about 
the size of military forces, their deployment, and exercises (to include Dayton Arms Control 
Accords, Open Skies, and Vienna Document).  
 
5. Tactical nuclear weapons at sea and the validity of the Agreement to Avoid Serious Incidents 
at Sea.  
 
6. New developments in conventional weaponry. For example, how do precision-guided munitions 
change doctrine? Change emphasis between nuclear and conventional?  
 
A one-time seminar on responses to technological advancements of new systems could highlight 
concerns over these new weapons and develop into a scientific inquiry into the feasibility of putting 
limits on such weapons. Of course, many issues arise. How would you stop countries from 
developing new weapons? Where would you negotiate agreements to ban such weapons (Conference 
on Disarmament, Certain Conventional Weapons Convention process, the Ottawa process)? What 
type of verification regime would you have to have in place?  
 
7. European security and role of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in the European military 
balance   
 
Transparency (Data Sharing) 
 
1. Exchange historical data about NSNW. U.S. and Russia could also reaffirm and confirm their 
commitment to the 1991/92 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives. This would be an important affirmation 
that both parties have eliminated those NSNWs that are most difficult to verify (artillery and mortar 
shells, land mines for example). The challenge here is that the information cannot be provided about 
warheads dismantled since the PNIs without indirectly providing information about the current 
numbers. Public, parallel, unilateral statements by Russia and the U.S. confirming the PNIs would 
apply to all U.S. and Russian NSNW, no matter where they are located would be a significant 
confidence building measure.  
 
The historical accounting in the context of implementation of Presidential nuclear initiatives of the 
early 1990s could reveal very sharp and encouraging reductions in NSNWs. Disclosure of the total 
numbers of NSNWs decommissioned pursuant to the PNI process would instill greater confidence 
regarding current capabilities and intentions. Were the parties to go even further and agree on 
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measures for verifying such claims, an admittedly challenging step, such a process could be used to 
develop the means for verifying compliance with limitations under a future NSNW arms control 
agreement. In order to make the process effective, each side would need to disclose the total number 
of NSNWs that were destroyed or de-commissioned and placed in storage under the PNIs, how they 
were de-commissioned, and what happened to resulting fissile material. It would presumably not be 
necessary to disclose the total starting and ending numbers of NSNWs held by each side, since the 
purpose here would be to validate historical claims made in connection with the PNIs, rather than to 
provide details on current inventories.  
 
2. Numbers, types of current NSNW.  
A second step would be to exchange information on the current numbers of NSNWs.  
 
3. Location/storage sites. To include transparency about sea-launched cruise missiles. Are the 
locations of NSNW significantly more sensitive than that for strategic weapons? If so, how do we 
deal with that issue in establishing baseline numbers and subsequently determining numbers of 
reductions? Could also include dual-capable aircraft. As confidence is built, notifications of changes 
in locations or sites might be possible.  
 
Russian officials have indicated the Russia may deploy dual-capable aircraft and missile systems in 
Crimea. This plan has raised concerns in both the United States and among some NATO allies about 
the potential threats posed by these weapons and the effect on tensions in the region. Discussions 
about the plans for these deployments, and notifications if and when the weapons move into the 
region, could ease some of these concerns. In exchange, the United States and NATO could provide 
Russia with notifications if and when they move U.S. nuclear weapons based in Europe. In addition 
to the concerns about stationing NSNW in Crimea, there are concerns that NSNWs could be brought 
to the territories of new NATO member-states in the Baltic area under the guise of Air Policing.   
 
4. Definitions (e.g. based on range, yield, missions or other criteria) and common categorization (e.g. 
active non-deployed, deployable in reserve or non-deployable awaiting disassembly) of NSNWs 
setting the parameters for data exchange including the categories which would be covered by 
transparency measures. These consultations on definitions/categorization and subsequent data 
exchanges could start the process of building mutual trust regarding NSNWs.  
 
5. Levels and indicators of operational readiness, and declarations of existing NSNW platforms.  
 
6. Notification of certain types of activity involving NSNW, primarily related to the movement 
of these weapons.  
 
7. Reciprocal onsite visits of former NSNW storage and deployment sites and to selected 
military sites designed to store non-strategic nuclear weapons when deployed from centralized 
storages to make sure that these sites are not used for storing the weapons on a regular basis. In 
the case of former sites, the example of the French invitation to CD member states to visit sites in 
April and June 2015 where air- and sea-based weapons were stored/deployed could offer a starting 
point. In the case of existing sites, the number and types of checks would be the subject of future 
negotiations between Russia and the United States on the establishment of a mutual transparency 





Similar visits in a NATO-Russia format would have the short-term goal of re-establishing contacts at 
the working level and in the medium-term could aim to discuss and develop on-site inspection 
procedures for storage sites and dismantlement facilities.  
 
8. Discussion of new technologies that may enhance transparency even at some distance.  
 
9. Discussions on alleged violations of INF Treaty (on both sides). These exchanges should take 
place at the expert level, preferably in the Special Verification Commission. The agenda would flow 
from the set of allegations both sides leveled against each other. Clarification of such allegations 
would likely involve confidential information exchanges, public statements as well as on-site visits to 
evaluate the explanations provided.  
 
10. How do we differentiate in a technical verification sense, a non-strategic warhead/weapon 
from a strategic one and should we in the future? Can we come up with functional definitions in a 
verification context that are observable/can be measured without revealing sensitive design 
information? Do we need to accept the possibility of state-by-state multiple definitions? Otherwise, 
inspectors would have to identify/differentiate non-strategic warheads from strategic warheads using 
technical verification measures that are able to perform warhead "type-differentiation" -- that is, more 
intrusive inspection measures.   
 
11. Data exchanges and notifications related to aviation and missile exercises: Over the past 
several months, analysts have documented high numbers of Russian aviation exercises that have 
come close to NATO and U.S. territory and have flown without transponders through international 
airspace. These events increase the chance of accidents that could lead to further escalation of 
tensions. NATO has also expanded its Baltic Air Policing missions and other exercises that bring 
aircraft close to Russian territory. Russia has objected to these exercises. Discussions about these 
exercises, and possible agreements on notifications before they occur, might not only reduce the risk 
of accidents but could also open a new path for cooperation that might help relieve some of the 




1. Development of technology to confirm presence/absence of nuclear weapons (or of sufficient 
mass of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons). Cooperative and collaborative verification 
R&D on a bilateral or multilateral basis, well in advance of actual negotiations, demonstrates 
positive intent, leads to beneficial mutual understanding of the most difficult problems, and offers the 
potential for more creative solutions.  
 
Anything beyond New START that seeks to constrain non-deployed strategic weapons will likely 
require intrusive monitoring. Initially it will be enough to use techniques and equipment that Russian 
and US inspectors are currently employing to confirm the accuracy of declared data on warheads on 
deployed ICBMs and SLBMs (see Chapter V of the Protocol to 2010 New START Treaty). Later, 
when experience is gained, the methods of intrusive technological control with respect to non-
strategic nuclear weapons can be refined on the basis of new developments as well as the technical 
experience of past cooperation such as was gained in 1990 with the cooperation of Russian and US 




2. Authentication of the prototype verification equipment, that is, to authenticate the 
measurement results. For intrusive verification measurements on sensitive nuclear items, it has yet 
to be demonstrated after nearly two decades of study by the U.S. and Russia that we can make such 
measurements and concomitantly prove to an inspecting party that these measurements can be 
believed.  
 
3. Collaboration on the development of verification techniques, including resumption of joint 
work on non-intrusive verification and monitoring measures. Lab-to-Lab cooperation in this area 
will support confidence building by developing innovative approaches and technologies to support 
future agreements on NSNWs. Experts could resume discussions conducted under the Trilateral 
Initiative with the IAEA.  
 
Working together, Russian and U.S. experts could collaboratively develop technologies for on-site 
and remote monitoring or production signatures and nuclear forensics. These collaborative efforts 
would increase confidence in ensuring both sides were in compliance with current and future arms 
control agreements. Some approaches might permit other concerned and relevant nations to 
participate. This may be one area where despite political tensions there could be a willingness to 
continue shared research projects.  
 
4. Continue efforts to develop non-intrusive inspection mechanisms, including nuclear 
dismantlement verification solutions that can be used to track a weapon from storage through 
the dismantlement process. Ideally, this capability could be refined to move beyond template 
matching to develop a unique fingerprint for each weapon system. It would be preferable for this to 
be done jointly between the US and Russia in a renewed lab-to-lab setting, because that would also 
serve as a confidence-building measure. If for security reasons that is not feasible, either side could 
take the lead. This is a short- to medium-term requirement.   
 
5. Support greater involvement by NNWS specialists in all aspects of intrusive inspection 
technology development. If the assumption is that no sensitive warhead design information is to be 
shared, there is no fundamental reason to exclude NNWS specialists. As part of this greater 
involvement, a review of the last 20 years of collaborative work between Russia and the United 
States needs to be undertaken for the benefit for new participants. This review should be conducted at 
the technical specialist level, not by policymakers or program leaders.  
 
6. Investigations into authenticatable information barriers, high security unique identifiers, 
template approaches to warhead type differentiation, warhead item container effects, non-
nuclear inherently non-sensitive warhead signatures, non-sensitive standard test objects, and 
advanced cryptographic approaches for item counting and locating.  
 
7. Continue R&D efforts on developing container monitoring such as muon radiography. This 
technology could be used both for monitoring the movement of containers purported to contain 
controlled nuclear munitions to ensure that the item inside the container is actually a radioactive 
source consistent with the claimed munition. It could also be used to check items leaving the facility 
at perimeter checkpoints to detect diverted materials.  
 
Such technologies may offer promise in other areas, including port security, so the development costs 
might be easier to justify and obtain. Because of this, multilateral development would be worth 




8. Academic conferences on technology development: Such projects could focus more on 
conceptual rather than development issues. For example, academic or scientific meetings could 
explore and identify the types of technologies that might be useful to verify the presence or absence 
of nuclear warheads or material in support of a possible future agreement to limit the locations or 
numbers of nonstrategic nuclear weapons.  
 
In addition to any official cooperation with government funding, parties could pursue some bilateral, 
scientist-based or academic-based projects.  
 
9. Multilateral technology experiments: While the bilateral track may be blocked for a while, there 
may be room for multilateral cooperative experiments on monitoring and verification technologies. 
While these may qualify more as discrete exhibitions (such as with the UK-Norway experiment) than 
programs that cooperate to develop new technologies, they may also help set the stage for 
cooperation in the future, if and when the arms control path returns.   
 
Safety and Security of NSNW 
 
1. Joint threat assessment of the risk of terrorists penetrating an NSNW storage site.  
For the first time the Russian military doctrine includes a reference to the threat of radiological 
terrorism. Specifically the new doctrine stated that there is a “growing threat of global extremism 
(terrorism) and the “real threat of terrorist acts using radioactive materials and toxic chemical 
agents”. So the doctrine once again confirmed that the issue of safety/security of NSNWs remains the 
highest priority for the Russian leadership.  
 
2. A joint assessment (including reciprocal visits to selected nuclear installations) of site 
security improvements to guard against risk of terrorist penetration.  
This could include sharing best practices for ensuring safety and security of NSNW. Could be 
augmented by visits to storage sites If there was a serious exchange of ideas regarding how the sides 
secure their NSNW, they might jointly red team to identify improvements.  
 
3. Exercises focused on nuclear accidents/incidents and associated consequence management. 
These could include recovery exercises (previously done) in which Russia and the U.S./NATO forces 
work together to recover stolen nuclear weapons or fissile material. Additional types of joint 
exercises (e.g. repulsing terrorist attack on nuclear installation) may be considered. But of course all 
these may be conducted only after resumption of the bilateral and multilateral (with NATO) military 
cooperation. In addition, exercises could help build broader awareness among decision-makers, 
diplomats and other stakeholders on the risks of unintended nuclear weapons use or a nuclear 
accident/incident, in the context of regional crises. For example, table-top exercises with NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly and Duma members, simulating a nuclear weapons emergency could help 
highlight the dangers associated with current nuclear postures. Public outreach around such an 
exercise could help to increase political awareness.  
 
4. Jointly develop nuclear accident/incident response procedures, including cooperative efforts 
in the event of a nuclear accident or theft or loss of NSNW-related materials. Discuss how 
NATO and Russia might interact and cooperate in the event that one of their NSNW was acquired by 
a non-state actor. Identify resource requirements including expert personnel and specialized 
equipment needed for emergency response, transportation requirements, forward basing options, and 
other details. Conduct tabletop and joint exercises to develop and test procedures for responding to 
27 
 
different crisis scenarios. Develop a set of best practices, and a venue for periodic review and update 
of same.  
 
These nuclear weapon safety demonstrations would increase transparency on weapons safety by the 
four nuclear weapon states (US, UK, Fr, RF), develop a common understanding of nuclear weapons 
safety procedures, share best practices, and build confidence on the full range of capabilities to 
respond effectively to emergencies involving nuclear weapons.   
 
5. Set up a UNSCR 1540 joint working group to explore challenges specific to safeguarding 
NSNW from access by non-state actors, and to develop a set of best practices. This could include 
sharing details on current measures used by each to comply with UNSCR 1540 and to safeguard 
NSNW-related items more generally. It could also include jointly evaluating strengths and 
weaknesses of existing security measures, ongoing steps being taken to improve safeguards, and 
potential for cooperation on developing new procedures and technology to achieve objectives with an 
eye on evolving best practices. This initiative could help boost efforts to implement UNSCR 1540 as 
well as cooperation on NSNW in a relatively low-risk context, since neither side would be required to 
disclose details regarding the size, composition or location of respective NSNW inventories.  
 
6. Initiate a dialogue between NATO and Russia on measures to avoid unintended escalation of 
military encounters (overlap with items in military doctrinal area). An open-ended dialogue 
could aim to evaluate how the Incidents at Sea Agreement and the Agreement on the Prevention of 











































NATO’s Deterrence and Defense Posture and NATO-Russia Transparency and Confidence 
Building Measures:  Looking Back to Look Forward 
Session I: Military Doctrine 
 
Guy B. Roberts1 
 
I. NATO’s Deterrence and Defense Posture—A Short Review 
 
During the Cold War (1948-1989) NATO’s deterrence and defense posture relied heavily on 
nuclear forces primarily because the Alliance was presumed to be in a position of conventional 
military inferiority in relation to the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. In the event of war, 
NATO expected that they would have to employ nuclear weapons within days in an attempt to 
convince the Soviets to stop the attack.  Subsequently, as a result of the 1967 Harmel Report the 
Alliance embarked on a “two-track” process that provided for military defense with nuclear 
weapons, but also equally emphasized détente, which included arms control, disarmament and 
balanced force reductions, to achieve and maintain peace and stability within Europe.2 
 
Since the end of the Cold War NATO has avoided any explicit references to Russia as a potential 
security challenge.  Indeed, the official Alliance position today is that Russia is and technically 
does remain a partner as a member of the Partnership for Peace in accordance with the NATO – 
Russia Founding Act of 1997.  The 1999 Strategic Concept noted, however, that “the existence 
of powerful nuclear forces outside the Alliance also constitutes a significant factor which the 
Alliance has to take into account if security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area are to be 
maintained.”3  The most “powerful nuclear forces outside the Alliance” were and remain those of 
Russia.   
 
Ten years later, NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept identified three core tasks of the Alliance one 
of which is collective defense using a mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defense 
capabilities.  It further alluded indirectly to Russia as a potential security threat by taking note of 
the extensive reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe since the end of the Cold War and 
stating that “in any future reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase 
transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate those weapons away from the 
territory of NATO members.  Any further steps must take into account the disparity with the 
greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons.”4  Nevertheless, the essential thrust of 
the Strategic Concept was to emphasize the Russia-NATO partnership and cooperation 
“convinced that the security of NATO and Russia is intertwined and that a strong and 
constructive partnership based on mutual confidence, transparency and predictability can best 
serve our security.”5   
 
                                                 
1 This is a discussion paper prepared for a workshop on non-strategic nuclear weapons sponsored by the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies held 4-5 June 2015.   
2 The Harmel Report is available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67927.htm.  
3 North Atlantic Council, “Strategic Concept,” November 7, 1991, para. 20.  Available at:  
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm.  
4 North Atlantic Council,” Strategic Concept,” November 19, 2010, para. 26.  Available at:  http://www.nato.int/strategic-
concept/index.html. 
5 Id. para 33-34. 
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 NATO’s defense posture has increasingly relied on conventional and missile defense 
capabilities to supplement its nuclear deterrence posture, which has been significantly readjusted 
at lower numbers with a promise to, as practicable, make further reductions.  As noted in the 
November 2010 Lisbon Summit Declaration: 
 
With the changes in the security environment since the end of the Cold War, we have 
dramatically reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and our reliance 
on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy.  We will seek to create the conditions for further 
reductions in the future.6 
 
However, as previously noted, any future reductions of U.S. weapons in Europe would be done 
only on the basis of reciprocity, which NATO has yet to define.  Of course, “reciprocity” does 
not necessarily have to be narrowly defined as equality or equivalence, nor should it be used as 
an excuse for holding back on measures that may be beneficial in their own right that could be 
undertaken by either the U.S. or collectively NATO in the hope of a “reciprocal” type response.  
The 1991-92 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) and the Cooperative Threat Reduction 
Programs, for example, were offered without a requirement for “reciprocity.” 
 
The 2010 Strategic Concept revalidated the importance of NATO’s deterrence posture stating 
that “deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a 
core element of our overall strategy….As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a 
nuclear alliance.”7  This was further confirmed by then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
declaring at a NATO foreign ministers’ meeting in April 2010 that “As a nuclear alliance, 
sharing nuclear risks and responsibilities widely is fundamental,” and emphasized the importance 
of the U.S. extended deterrence posture and the shared roles of as many Allies as possible.8 
 
The Alliance’s current nuclear posture or arrangements include multinational risk and 
responsibility sharing and multinational decision making and policy implementation.  With the 
exception of France, all NATO allies participate in nuclear policy and planning decisions and at 
least 16 nations have active roles in the nuclear mission with regard to U.S. nuclear weapons 
stationed in Europe.9 These arrangements have promoted Alliance cohesions, increased the 
influence of the non-nuclear European Allies regarding U.S. nuclear policy, and reassured the 
Allies as to the genuineness and effectiveness of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence commitments. 
 
After agreeing to the 2010 Strategic Concept, the Alliance then undertook an extensive review of 
its deterrence and defense posture.  That review, called the 2012 Deterrence and Defense Posture 
                                                 
6 North Atlantic Council, Lisbon Summit Declaration, para. 31.  Available at: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm.   Note also para 30 where the Alliance confirms the importance of 
deterrence as a core element of collective defense.  
7 North Atlantic Council, “Strategic Concept,” November 7, 1991, para. 17.  Available at:  
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm.  
8 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton quoted in Mark Landler, “U.S. Resists Push by Allies for Tactical Nuclear Cuts,” New York 
Times, April 23, 2010. 
9 Even though France in 2008 decided to participate in NATO’s integrated military structure it decided not to participate in the 
Nuclear Planning Group deliberations, and, unlike the United Kingdom’s nuclear forces, are not presumed to be automatically 
available (the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review designated these weapons as “assigned” to NATO.  There are no nuclear 
weapons assigned to NATO as they remain under the operational control of the nuclear weapon states. The term was used to 
differentiate U.S. and UK weapons available to NATO and French weapons which are not.) 
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Review (DDPR), reaffirmed these long-standing arrangements for risk and responsibility sharing 
in nuclear deterrence.  Importantly, the DDPR further stated that “Nuclear weapons are a core 
component of NATO’s overall capabilities for deterrence and defense alongside conventional 
and missile defense forces.  The review has shown that the Alliance’s nuclear force posture 
currently meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and defense posture.”10   In other words, 
the DDPR examined a number of alternative methods for sharing the risks and responsibilities of 
the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe and concluded the current posture remains the 
most effective.  Nevertheless, as stated in the DDPR, NATO committed to continuously search 
for ways in which all Allies can effectively participate and further bolster deterrence as a core 
element of collective defense and thus, in so doing, substantially contribute to the indivisible 
security of the Alliance.   
 
Allies also agreed that U.S. nuclear weapons based in Europe send a more potent deterrent 
message about U.S. commitments than reliance solely on U.S. nuclear weapons deployed at sea 
or based in North America.  With the U.S. nuclear weapons presence in Europe, extensive 
nuclear risk and responsibility sharing, and consultative arrangements for decision making, the 
Alliance has greater confidence in its strength and cohesion than it would have without these 
interrelated attributes—and greater confidence that adversaries will recognize NATO’s resolve 
and capabilities.   
 
One concern often expressed is the ability of Allies to influence U.S. proposals to Russia on 
transparency and confidence building measures due to the fact that the object of such 
negotiations are U.S. and Russian owned and controlled assets.  Consequently, an important part 
of U.S. extended deterrence security guarantees to Allies, which is an integral part of NATO’s 
nuclear posture, is the commitment of the U.S. to consult with and inform them with regard to 
U.S.-Russia bilateral negotiations, preferably prior to any agreed outcome. 
 
That said, Allies are, however, becoming increasingly less capable of effective military action, 
spending less on military forces and cutting back on existing conventional military capabilities. 
The 2010 Strategic Concept called for “the ability to sustain concurrent major joint operations 
and several smaller operations for collective defense and crisis response…”  The NATO-led 
intervention in Libya in 2011 suggests that the conventional military capabilities of the Allies fall 
far short of this level of ambition.  Robert Gates, the then U.S. Secretary of Defense, said in June 
2011: 
Libya has just hammered home the consequences of many years of underinvestment:  If 
even our biggest allies are beginning to feel the stress and strain, where the hell would we 
have been if we’d actually had to deal with the Soviets?... For God’s sake, this is 
Gaddafi, this isn’t some big power.  The fact that there are challenges in sustaining just 
an air campaign even for 90 days is, I think, revealing.11 
 
This has implications for NATO’s nuclear posture since any reduction or adjustment of that 
posture would need to be “re-balanced” with conventional forces.  At the 2014 Wales Summit, 
                                                 
10North Atlantic Council, “Deterrence and Defence Posture Review,” May 20, 2012, para. 8.  Available at: 
 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87597.htm.  




Allies re-committed themselves to spending 2% of GDP on defense, established a 4000 man 
Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, bolstered the Baltic air defense mission, and the U.S. 
agreed to a $1 billion European Reassurance Initiative to finance rotating U.S. forces, air and 
ground, to eastern Europe for training and exercises.  However, due to budget austerity measures, 
host UK “spending for 2016/17 is due to fall to £36.bn, equivalent to 1.85% of GDP.”12  Italy 
and Germany are cutting their military budgets with only Poland, Latvia and Lithuania 
increasing their military spending to meet the 2% defense spending goal.  As many as 9 NATO 
countries may spend less than 1% of GDP on defense despite the current security and stability 
dangers Allies recognized at the 2014 Wales Summit when they committed to the 2% spending 
goal.13  Given past promises broken on defense spending, one can’t help but remain skeptical 
regarding the Alliance’s resolve to fully implement these promises.  Even so, there was no move 
to readjust NATO’s current nuclear posture.14 
 
II.  NATO’s Support for Arms Control and Disarmament 
 
Although NATO itself has never been a party to an arms control agreement, negotiations and 
proposals concerning constraints on military forces and activities have been elements of the 
security and defense strategies of NATO Allies since the 1950s.  Indeed, “contributing actively 
to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament” as an element of cooperative security is a 
core Alliance task.15  The DDPR also examined the utility of NATO’s posture vis-à-vis arms 
control, disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives, and confirmed the important role these 
measures have to play in maintaining peace and security complementing NATO’s deterrence and 
defense posture—in essence the “two track” Harmel approach.  Despite trepidations over 
Russian actions vis-à-vis Georgia and elsewhere, NATO leaders agreed to further engage with 
Russia on transparency and confidence building measures related specifically to U.S./NATO and 
Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs).16 
 
The Alliance’s decision was motivated by several considerations. First of all, work on these 
measures brought together NATO members with different perspectives on the role of nuclear 
weapons, particularly with regard to U.S. NSNW based in Europe. It also provided a common 
way forward for those Allies calling for further and “bolder” reductions or even complete 
withdrawal of U.S. weapons from Europe and those that favored the maintenance of the status 
quo.  Whatever position particular Allies advocated none called for unilateral withdrawal 
                                                 
12Richard Norton-Taylor, “Ignore US and Nato - cuts in UK defence budget could be a good thing,” The Guardian, March 25, 
2015; Available at:  http://www.theguardian.com/news/defence-and-security-blog/2015/mar/16/ignore-us-and-nato-cuts-in-uk-
defence-budget-could-be-a-good-thing  
13 Jonathan Beale, “Nato defence spending falls despite promises to reverse cuts,” BBC News, February 26, 2015; Available at: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-31619553 
14 North Atlantic Council, Wales Summit Declaration, 5 September 2014; paras. 49, 50; available at: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm.  
15 North Atlantic Council, “Strategic Concept,” November 19, 2010, para 4; available at: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm. 
16 “Active Engagement, Modern Defense: Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of the Members of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon 
19–20 November 2010,” www.nato.int/strategic-concept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf; “Deterrence and Defense 





preferring “reciprocal” quid pro quo measures that would address Russia’s overwhelming 
superiority in numbers of NSNW.  
 
As tasked by the DDPR, NATO worked on developing possible confidence and security building 
measures (CSBM) options.  Work on CSBMs was perceived as an element of preparing for an 
eventual U.S.–Russia arms control process encompassing NSNWs. Confidence-building 
measures were also seen as useful in terms of exploring definitional difficulties related to those 
weapons,17 and legal and practical challenges of verification of existing arsenals of non-deployed 
but operatively deployable warheads kept in storage, particularly with regard to NSNWs 
stored/deployed to Europe. 
 
Last but not least, work on transparency and confidence-building was also seen as a tool for 
alleviating uncertainties and concerns related to some elements of the Russian nuclear posture, 
including its alleged doctrine of nuclear de-escalation (i.e., using NSNWs to stop conventional 
forces and thus end the conflict), and size and location of Russia’s NSNW arsenal. From a 
broader perspective, it is also seen as a means of creating additional space for political and 
military cooperation, including expanding interactions between NATO and Russian civilian and 
military officials. 
 
Interestingly, these CSBM’s also have the potential to cause difficulties for the U.S.  Information 
on numbers and past or current locations of NSNWs could raise de-classification issues, security 
concerns, and political sensitivities over non-nuclear weapon states roles in the nuclear mission. 
Likewise ambiguity on these issues is considered an inherent part of NATO and Russia’s 
deterrence posture.  
 
After reviewing a number of proposals, NATO’s Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-
Proliferation Committee has reportedly selected two Transparency and Confidence building 
Measure proposals for possible discussion with Russia: 
 
1. Organization of NATO–Russia briefings or seminars on nuclear doctrines and 
2. Coordinating unilateral or multilateral statements on nuclear policy. 
 
These relatively modest options, culled from previous NATO-Russia work on CSBMS, 
demonstrate that even despite NATO’s declaratory openness, any progress on more 





                                                 
17 NSNWs are also often referred to as tactical or theater nuclear weapons.  The terms are often used interchangeably.  Debate 
also swirls around the difference between “strategic” nuclear weapons and “non-strategic” nuclear weapons. One of the major 
challenges in negotiating reductions of NSNWs will be definitional. 
18 See O. Meier, S. Lunn, “Trapped: NATO, Russia, and the Problem of Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” Arms Control 





III.  Roadblocks to New NATO-Russia Transparency and Confidence Building 
Measures 
 
Russia’s perspective on any arms control and/or confidence-building measures related to 
NSNWs is very different from that of the NATO states.19 Moscow does not see any reason to 
consider NSNW-related arms-control measures separately or to single out this particular 
category of weapons as long as its own concerns, such as the U.S. ballistic missile defense 
deployments in Europe or the development of long-range conventional precision-guided 
munitions, are not addressed appropriately. Also, for Russia, any talks on NSNW are conditional 
upon the withdrawal of all U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe to U.S. territory. 
 
Clearly Russia and the U.S. disagree on acceptable terms for further nuclear arms reductions 
partly because their policies differ dramatically on the utility of nuclear weapons.  In December 
2012, the U.S. National Intelligence Council summed up this difference as follows:  “Nuclear 
ambitions in the US and Russia over the last 20 years have evolved in opposite directions.  
Reducing the role of nuclear weapons in US security strategy is a U.S. objective, while Russia is 
pursuing new concepts and capabilities for expanding the role of nuclear weapons in its security 
strategy.”20 
 
Consequently, U.S. and Russian views on future negotiations on NSNW could not be starker.  In 
a June 2013 speech, President Obama declared that “After a comprehensive review, I’ve 
determined that we can ensure the security of America and our allies, and maintain a strong and 
credible strategic deterrent, while reducing our deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-
third.  And I intend to seek negotiated cuts with Russia to move beyond Cold War nuclear 
postures.”21  This “vision” was enthusiastically embraced by NATO Allies.  Contrast that with 
President Putin’s statement in 2012 that “We should not tempt anyone by allowing ourselves to 
be weak. We will, under no circumstances, surrender our strategic deterrent capability. Indeed, 
we will strengthen it.”22 
 
Russian officials responded to President Obama’s initiative by repeating a list of preconditions 
for further negotiations including the removal of all US NSNW from Europe, and the 
participation of other nuclear weapons states in the reductions negotiations and process.23  
Another senior official said that the negotiations should include not only the five NPT-
recognized nuclear weapon states but “all states which in fact possess nuclear weapons.” He 
reiterated the Russian position that the negotiations should encompass “the entire complex of 
factors that influence…strategic stability,” such as missile defense, weapons in space and “a 
                                                 
19 See A. Zagorski, Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Posture, Politics and Arms Control, Hamburger 
Beiträge zur Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik, Heft 156, IFSH, Hamburg, 2011; “The Future of Non-strategic 
Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Options Available,” Security Index: A Russian Journal on International Security, vol. 19, 
no. 2, 2013. 
20 U.S. National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030:  Alternative Worlds (Washington, DC; National Intelligence Council, 
December 2012, 69, available at: www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/global-trends-2030.  
21 President Obama, remarks at the Brandenburg Gate, Berlin, German, June 19, 2013, available at: www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2013/06/19remarks-president-obama-brandenburg-gate-berlin-germany.  
22 Vladimir Putin, “Being Strong: Why Russia Needs to Rebuild its Military,” Foreign Policy, February 21, 2012, available at:  
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/02/21/being-strong/.  
23 Pavel Felgenhauer, “Obama’s Nuclear Cuts Initiative Meets Frosty Response in Moscow,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 10, no. 117 
(June 20, 2013). 
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serious imbalance in the sphere of conventional weapons in Europe.”24  Recently, at the 2015 
Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, a senior Russian official even suggested that 
Russia may have to increase the size of its nuclear arsenal in response to alleged U.S. 
“provocations,” which included: “U.S. missile defense program, the U.S. refusal to negotiate on 
the ban on weapons in outer space, the U.S. military's Prompt Global Strike (PGS) system, 
Washington's de facto refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the serious 
imbalance in conventional weapons in Europe.”25 
 
While Russia piled on pre-conditions for beginning discussions on NSNWs, Russian actions vis-
à-vis Georgia and Ukraine has resulted in growing tensions and mistrust between Russia and 
NATO culminating in the suspension of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) dialogue, and, for the 
near term greatly diminishing the probability of any official future work on CSBMs.   
 
The deteriorating state of relations was evident at the 2014 NATO Wales Summit with the 
Alliance condemning Russia’s “escalating and illegal military intervention in Ukraine, [and] its 
illegitimate occupation of Crimea.”26  Further, the Alliance, in subsequently suspending all work 
in the NRC, also pointed out that “Russia's pattern of disregard for international law, including 
the UN Charter; its behavior towards Georgia and the Republic of Moldova; its violation of 
fundamental European security arrangements and commitments, including those in the Helsinki 
Final Act; its long-standing non-implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 
Treaty (CFE); and its use of military and other instruments to coerce neighbors. This threatens 
the rules-based international order and challenges Euro-Atlantic security.”27 
 
IV. Prospects for Future Work on NATO-Russia Transparency and Confidence Building 
Measures 
 
While criticizing Russia for breaching its commitments, violating international law, and 
“breaking the trust at the core of our cooperation,” NATO nevertheless continues to believe in 
continuing a “strategic discussion” regarding Euro-Atlantic security, and the importance of 
having a strategic “partnership” with Russia that would include transparency and confidence 
building measures.  This is contingent, however, on a constructive change in Russia’s actions 
demonstrating compliance with international law and Russia’s international obligations and 
responsibilities.  As stated in Wales: 
 
We continue to believe that a partnership between NATO and Russia based on respect for 
international law would be of strategic value. We continue to aspire to a cooperative, 
constructive relationship with Russia, including reciprocal confidence building and 
transparency measures and increased mutual understanding of NATO's and 
Russia's non-strategic nuclear force postures in Europe, based on our common 
                                                 
24 Alexander Yakovenko, “Is it Possible to Make a Nuclear-free World?,” June 28, 2013, http://rt.com/op-edge/nuclear-free-
obama-berlin-399/.  
25 Zachary Keck, “Russia Threatens to Build More Nuclear Weapons,” The National Interest, May 18, 2015; available at: 
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/russia-threatens-build-more-nuclear-weapons-12912. 
26 North Atlantic Council, Wales Summit Declaration, 5 September 2014; para. 16; available at: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm.  




security concerns and interests, in a Europe where each country freely chooses its 
future. We regret that the conditions for that relationship do not currently exist. As a 
result, NATO's decision to suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation 
between NATO and Russia remains in place. Political channels of communication, 
however, remain open. (Emphasis added)28 
 
The opportunity to advance CSBMs related to NSNW are, for the moment, obviously low due to 
the divergent approaches of the NATO member states and Russia, and the continued 
deterioration of Russia–NATO relations due to the ongoing crisis in and around Ukraine which 
further complicates the picture further. NATO–Russia relations have entered a period of turmoil 
in which both sides are focused more on sending signals of military strength rather than on 
transparency and confidence-building, with political-level dialogue and practical cooperation 
limited to a bare minimum.  The situation has been further exacerbated by Russian “statements 
about possible future stationing of nuclear weapons and delivery systems in Crimea.” 
Consequently, at a May 2015 NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting, the Alliance again strongly 
condemned “Russia’s aggressive actions and continued violation of international law and its 
international obligations.... [calling] on Russia to fully abide by international law.”29 
 
Since the inception of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC)30 transparency and confidence building 
measures, particularly with respect with NSNW, have been an important part of the developing 
relationship between NATO and Russia, and a demonstration of NATO’s support for 
transparency and confidence building measures.  NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept (Art. 26) 
makes it clear that: 
 
In any future reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase 
transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from the 
territory of NATO members.  Any further steps must take into account the disparity with 
the greater Russian stockpiles of short–range nuclear weapons.31  
Likewise in the 2012 DDPR (Art. 25): 
Allies look forward to continuing to develop and exchange transparency and confidence-
building ideas with the Russian Federation in the NATO-Russia Council, with the goal of 
developing detailed proposals on and increasing mutual understanding of NATO’s and 
Russia’s non-strategic nuclear force postures in Europe.32 
In keeping with the imperative of follow-on negotiations after new START and the Alliance 
mandate in the Strategic Concept to develop a set of concrete proposals, NATO Allies have 
subsequently proposed a broad set of measures to achieve greater transparency, mutual trust and 
                                                 
28 Id. at para. 22. 
29 NATO Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, “Joint Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Commission,” 13 May 2015; available at: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_119425.htm. 
30 The NRC was established at the NATO-Russia Summit in Rome on 28 May 2002 by the Declaration on “NATO-Russia 
Relations: a New Quality”. The Rome Declaration builds on the goals and principles of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act on 
Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, which remains the formal basis for NATO-Russia relations. 
31 Available at: http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf.  




confidence regarding NSNWs.  Discussion on these measures have been within the framework of 
the NRC which, due to the Ukrainian invasion by Russia, has currently suspended any further 
work below the ambassadorial level. 
 
The Alliance recognizes that there remains a substantial number of NSNWs in Europe.  
Consequently, there may be utility in having increased transparency concerning numbers, types, 
locations, command arrangements, operational status, and level of storage security.  For obvious 
security reasons, however, there are limits to how much information might be provided 
particularly since deliberate ambiguity in many aspects of NATO and Russia's nuclear posture is 
viewed as enhancing deterrence.   
 
A broad range of transparency and confidence building measures have already been proposed 
and incorporated into, initially, the NRC’s Nuclear Experts Group, which was subsequently 
merged into the NRC Defense, Transparency, Strategy and Reform (DTSR) Committee program 
of activities.  The Nuclear Experts Group developed and produced a comprehensive “plan of 
action” for transparency and confidence building measures with short, mid, and long term 
programs of work.  Before merging into the DTSR Committee the Group aggressively pursued 
agreed “short-term” measures, which included an agreed dictionary of nuclear-related terms, 
establishing and conducting a series of nuclear incident/accident safety and security exercises,33 
and holding twice-a-year seminars on nuclear doctrine and strategy.34  Details on a number of 
other agreed short term and mid-term measures were under discussion which, in a different 
political climate, continue to hold promise for expanding transparency and confidence building. 
These included but are not limited to the following: 
 
1. Reciprocal information exchange of safety and security systems used at nuclear sites 
(displays, presentations, visits). 
 
2. Officer exchange visits and programs. 
 
3. Information exchanges about historical and current numbers of nuclear weapons and 
delivery systems. 
 
                                                 
33 NRC nuclear experts have participated since 2004 in four such exercises aimed at increasing transparency, developing a 
common understanding of nuclear weapons safety procedures and mechanisms, and building confidence on the full range of 
capabilities to respond effectively to emergencies involving nuclear weapons.  Each nuclear weapon state held an exercise with 
Russia first in 2004 followed by the UK in 2006, the U.S. and France in 2007.  In addition, the NRC held a seminar on 
incident/accident lessons learned in 2007, and another seminar on responses to improvised radiological weapons in 2010.  A 
follow-on exercise was planned in which the four nuclear weapon states would collaborate in response to a nuclear incident on 
the territory of a non-nuclear weapon state. However, Russian insistence that it be held on the territory of one of the Allies flying 
dual-capable (nuclear) aircraft (DCA) when only a non-DCA state (Czech Republic) volunteered derailed the process. 
34 Seminars on nuclear doctrines and strategies have been previously conducted with the last such session in June 2013 at The 
Hague.  See “Netherlands Foreign Minister Discusses Nuclear Seminar,” NATO-Russia Council, 1 July 2013, available at: 
www.nato-russia-council.info/en/articles/20130701-nrc-nuclear-seminar. The author, as a NATO official, organized three such 
sessions in which the NATO nuclear states (France, UK and the US) and Russia described in rare detail their nuclear policies and 
provided a very general description of their nuclear posture.  It was agreed that these sessions would be held once every two 





4. Briefings to the NRC on collaborative work by Russia and the US on new verification 
techniques, including joint-work on non-intrusive verification/monitoring 
technologies. 
 
Most of the other measures proposed in the course of the Group’s work were considered long-
term goals contingent on a continuing and robust collaborative and cooperative security vision as 
contemplated in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act: 
NATO and Russia, based on an enduring political commitment undertaken at the highest 
political level, will build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area 
on the principles of democracy and cooperative security…..Proceeding from the principle 
that the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible, NATO and 
Russia will work together to contribute to the establishment in Europe of common and 
comprehensive security based on the allegiance to shared values, commitments and 
norms of behavior in the interests of all states… NATO and Russia will seek the widest 
possible cooperation among participating States of the OSCE with the aim of creating in 
Europe a common space of security and stability, without dividing lines or spheres of 
influence limiting the sovereignty of any state.35 
IV.  Concluding Thoughts 
 
In the coldest days of the Cold War, the United States and Russia worked together to lay the 
foundations of the current global nuclear order. And in better days, we worked together to 
strengthen it, by creating communication, transparency and confidence building measures to 
stabilize our relationship, reducing our weapons stockpiles, strengthening the IAEA safeguards 
regime, and preventing nuclear proliferation.  With the end of the Cold War NATO and Russia 
developed a new relationship—partnership if you will—based on mutual interest in maintaining 
peace and security within the Euro-Atlantic region, a relationship that NATO expected to be one 
of cooperation and collaboration, instead of confrontation, where arms control and CSBMs 
would play a leading role eventually leading to a world free of nuclear weapons.  That world 
view no longer appears on the immediate horizon. 
The unfortunate economic and human costs of the current crisis – for Russia, Ukraine, and 
Europe – are self-evident and growing. But we cannot lose sight of the opportunity costs as well. 
Nowhere are these more vivid than in the nuclear arena. As the world’s two largest nuclear 
powers, the United States and Russia should continue to have a shared sense of responsibility for 
safeguarding the nuclear order, an order where NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture figures 
prominently in maintaining peace and security as well as preventing the further proliferation of 
nuclear weapons in Europe and beyond. The wider cause of global nuclear order will be set back 
significantly if we can’t find a way to exercise our shared responsibility to help keep the world 
safe and secure from nuclear dangers. 
                                                 
35 “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the 
Russian Federation,” May 27, 1997; available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_25468.htm.  
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One can safely conclude that until the current crisis in Ukraine is successfully overcome, any 
proposals related to NSNW CSBMs, no matter how anodyne and modest, will be still born as 
long as the work of the NATO–Russia Council is limited to ambassadorial-level meetings and as 
long as cooperation between NATO, the U.S. and Russia is suspended.36 Still, there is a need for 
work on different and innovative CSBMs so that practical and reasonable measures could be in 
place when the political momentum for agreement on such measures is once again viable.  
 
In that regard, our Track 2 discussions offer a platform for moving work on NSNW CSBMs 
further, even during the current unfavorable political conditions, to explore the merits, feasibility 
and mutual benefits of prospective measures, and, in doing so, setting the stage for a moment 
when the issue is back on the agenda and the political window of opportunity opens again. 
Indeed, while official communication channels remain paralyzed the relative value of our Track 
2 efforts are likely to grow as we work to prepare the ground for future Tract 1 initiatives and 
build broad support for future arms control agreements with the aim of creating and preserving a 





                                                 
36 On 1 April 2014, as a response to Russian actions in Ukraine, NATO members limited the NATO–Russia 
Council Dialogue to the ambassadorial level and above and suspended practical and military cooperation with Russia. 



























Session II: Transparency Pros and Cons 
Eugene Miasnikov 
 
Before making concrete comments about the ideas for discussion in our program, I’d like to talk 
a little bit about some fundamental things. Therefore, let me start the introduction to the session 
with some observations about the history of U.S.-Russian dialog on transparency of non-strategic 
nuclear weapons. 
 
Bush-Gorbachev initiatives of early 1990s, usually called as PNIs, happened not on an empty 
place. Both sides perceived that their nuclear arsenals are exceedingly excessive. 
 
At that time Russia desperately needed financial assistance to maintain safety and security of the 
nuclear arsenal inherited from the Soviet Union. Nunn-Lugar projects were originated because 
there was a formidable task to safely move the previously deployed nuclear weapons to central 
storage facilities and to securely keep them there until most of them would be dismantled.  
 
Among other things, one of the reasons why Russia entered the dialog on transparency of nuclear 
warheads was ensuring irreversibility of reductions envisaged by START Treaty. That is why 
this dialog became possible.  
 
But, perhaps, the most important thing was that PNIs and other transparency initiatives discussed 
later were implemented during the period, when the Russian leadership had a vision how Russia 
would integrate into the western political and economical institutions. Such a vision 
unfortunately does not exist anymore.  
 
However, even during the period of the warmest U.S. - Russian relations transparency measures 
regarding NSNWs did not go much further PNIs and lab-to lab research work.  
 
Why? One of the explanations could be that there is huge difference in attitudes toward 
transparency in the U.S. and Russia. If transparency is perceived in the U.S. positively in 
general, Russian perceptions are very different for both cultural and political reasons. At worst, 
transparency is perceived in Russia as a “Trojan horse”, at best - as a value questionable from the 
national security prospective.  
 
Transparency regarding military issues (and, in particular, nuclear issues) was most of all 
considered in Russia not as a “new value” intrinsic to a democratic society as many of my 
American colleagues might perceive, but as a concession to the West, a price for Russia’s 
integration into the western institutions. As the illusions of the Russian leadership about the 





So, what is the bottom line? One cannot enter the same river twice. One has to admit that factors, 
that paved the way to the joint work on transparency of nuclear warheads in the past, do not exist 
anymore. There is a need to find a new basis, new bedrock for resumption of this work. 
Hopefully, there will be no need to start from a scratch, but if new promising fundamental ideas 
for cooperation in this filed are not found in the near future, the previous experience will most 
likely be lost. Unfortunately, this idea is missing in the document prepared for our discussion. It 
seems to me that it is the key challenge for us and it should be the focus for our discussion. 
 
Of course, resumption of previous work on transparency of nuclear weapons requires sufficient 
amount of mutual trust between the parties. However, one has to overcome not only the 
inadequate degree of trust between the two sides, but also differences in legislation and in 
definitions of what constitutes sensitive information.  
 
The existing trends are not promising. You may have heard that just a week ago President Putin 
signed an order that significantly broadens the list of items considered to be a state secret. 
Information about organization of forces providing security of special facilities as well as their 
capabilities and methods are now a state secret. The order does not give any specifics, but I 
would not be surprised to learn, that it also covers those special facilities where nuclear weapons 
are stored. If so, my Russian colleagues would be unable even to talk openly about possible 
transparency measures on such facilities. 
 
Now, let me make a few comments with regard to eleven ideas for developing transparency 
measures mentioned in the program. Most of them are not new. Some are more than a decade old 
and relevant to the more cooperative environment between the U.S. and Russia. However, this 
fact does not preclude revisiting these ideas and adopting them to the current situation. 
 
1) Among the proposed ideas I found the most interesting the one on discussing remote sensing 
technologies that may enhance transparency (#8). Particularly notable is a statement made 
recently by General Ryzhkov, Head of the Directorate of Arms Control Treaties Implementation 
of the Russian MoD. He said that future arms control should be based more on confidence 
measures and national technical means (NTMs) rather than on inspections.1 Therefore discussing 
remote sensing technologies could be of interest to Russia, if Russia wants to put more emphasis 
on NTMs in the implementation of arms control agreements in future. 
 
2) Idea # 4. I believe, that a discussion on definitions is doomed to failure unless a practical goal 
of such a discussion is clearly set. Definitions in existing treaties (e.g. START) have been 
worked out because the sides set up a common goal and had agreed the frameworks for the 
treaties. Definitions were always secondary, and they were always changing as new treaties were 
negotiated. Just to give an example, there is a significant difference between the meanings of 
“deployed warheads” in the old START (1991) and new START (2010).  
 




3) Idea # 10. I think, that Professor Rogov made a good point yesterday at the dinner on the need 
to rethink definitions of weapons. There is a way to avoid the question on how to differentiate 
strategic from non-strategic warheads. Instead of such an approach, we may divide existing 
nuclear arsenals on “deployed” and “non-deployed” (kept on storage) categories. Apparently, 
verification concepts and control procedures toward these suggested two categories need to be 
entirely different. There is more commonality between verifying non-deployed non-strategic and 
strategic warheads rather than verifying deployed and non-deployed strategic warheads. Such an 
approach could also facilitate involving other nuclear states in a transparent multilateral nuclear 
reductions process.      
 
4) Ideas # 1, 2, 3. It is not realistic to expect that each of the measures proposed in these ideas 
can be implemented at once. The sides could start building mutual transparency by small steps. 
For example, U.S. and Russia could begin with selected types or numbers of warheads slated for 
elimination. On the first phase the goal of transparency measures could be verified destruction of 
those warheads. Such kind of work could promote resumption of lab-to-lab and military-to-
military cooperation and gradual build-up of mutual confidence necessary for further steps like 
sensitive data exchanges. 
 
5) The idea #3 mentions transparency about sea-launched cruise missiles. The case of nuclear 
SLCMs may turn out to be the most complicated, because Russia and the U.S. had previously 
disagreements on what type of category SLCMs should fall to. For a long time Russia considered 
nuclear SLCMs as strategic systems. The U.S objected this approach. The compromise in 
START (1991) was that the sides agreed to exchange data on nuclear SLCM deployments 
annually, though SLCMs did not become the subject of the treaty. Moreover, Helsinki 
agreements of 1997 clearly articulated a distinction between tactical nuclear weapons and 
nuclear SLCMs. Taking into account frequently raised Russia’s concerns about U.S. 
conventional sea launched cruise missiles, the solution of the problem needs to include 
transparency measures regarding conventional SLCMs as well.  
 
And finally, in addition to the ideas mentioned in the document, let me propose another one. U.S. 
and Russia could make unilateral commitments not to conduct research, development and 
manufacture of new types of non-strategic weapons. Even if such commitments are made as 
unilateral statements, and no verification procedures are assumed, they could facilitate creating a 
healthier environment for future discussion on transparency measures with regard to non-




Session II: Transparency Pros and Cons 
Sergey Rogov 
 
Strategic Stability and Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons 
  
 The arrival of nuclear missile weapons as a factor in the bi-polar system of international 
relations fundamentally changed the concept of strategic military balance, reducing it to parity in 
intercontinental nuclear weapons (range of action over 5,500 km) between the two superpowers, 
the United States. and the USSR. These new weapons could provide decisive results in a short 
time by annihilating half the population and two-thirds of the industrial potential in the enemy 
country (mutual assured destruction).      
 This narrow definition was limited to warheads carried by intercontinental and submarine-
launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. No attention was paid to medium- and short-range 
nuclear weapons, or to the giant stocks of conventional weapons that the United States and the 
USSR possessed. Furthermore, other countries’ nuclear and non-nuclear weapons were also 
excluded from this scheme.                  
 At the same time, this understanding also included limitations on anti-missile defense. This 
led to the narrow interpretation of the concept of “strategic stability” that became the basis for 
Soviet-American accords on nuclear weapons control. The SALT agreements and BMD Treaty of 
1972 imposed quantitative limitations on START and strategic missile defense.                    
 The model of “mutual nuclear deterrence”, or “mutually assured destruction” (MAD) took 
shape in the Soviet-American relations by the early 1970s. It was codified in a system of arms 
control treaties including the SALT (START) and ABM agreements.      
 Arms control was expanded at the end of the Cold War. The INF Treaty was signed in 1987 
and under it the two superpowers destroyed their land-based missiles that have a range of action 
from 500 to 5,500 km. In addition, Washington and Moscow in 1991 announced their unilateral, 
but parallel measures towards tactical nuclear weapons reduction. The multilateral Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) was signed in 1990 to impose limitations on 
five types of conventional weapons (tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and 
strike helicopters). Along with the United States and the USSR, the list of signatories included all 
NATO and Warsaw Treaty member countries on a parity basis. But no limitations were set on 
navy armaments, except for submarine-launched ballistic missiles.         
                                             
Broad Definition of Strategic Stability 
 The MAD model survived the end of the Cold War and remains the basis of military-strategic 
relations between Russia and the United States. The new START Treaty, signed in 2010, does not 
revoke MAD, and in fact makes this model more lasting and stable. 
 This narrow definition of “strategic stability” persisted until recently, and this was registered 
in the new START Treaty that covered only traditional components of the strategic triad.       
 In the early 21st century, however, the military-strategic balance is not confined to strategic 
nuclear forces. Today, achieving decisive objectives in war (hitting a wide range of military targets 
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and economic areas, destroying political administration and military command systems) is possible 
using non-nuclear weapons. New non-nuclear weapons boast destructive capacities that are 
increasingly close to that of nuclear weapons. In the coming decades, strategic non-nuclear 
weapons will, it seems, mature to a point at which they are able to exert a considerable impact on 
the military-strategic balance. In fact, the United States takes the lead in creating strategic non-
nuclear weapons.       
 It is significant that the first decade of this century saw the remit of the United States Strategic 
Command (USSTRATCOM) expand considerably as part of its fundamental, root and branch, 
reorganization. USSTRATCOM initially brought together the strategic nuclear forces of the U.S. 
Air Force and Navy. Its structure comprises the Joint Functional Component Command for Global 
Strike (JFCC-GS) that includes nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, the Joint Functional Component 
Command for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR), the United States Space 
Command (USSPACECOM), the Joint Functional Command Component for Integrated Missile 
Defense (JFCC IMD), the United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) let by the director of 
the National Security Agency, among others.  
  In 2011 and 2012, official representatives of Russia and the United States held consultations 
on strategic stability. Certain differences came to the fore in their respective approaches.  
 The American side tends towards the narrow understanding of strategic stability that was 
accepted in the Cold War and chiefly involved the balance of strategic offensive nuclear forces. 
This approach is sometimes identified in the U.S. as “arms race stability,” requiring approximate 
parity in the size and composition of strategic nuclear forces. This is the approach that served as 
the foundation for the SALT, START and SORT treaties.    
 The American side proceeds from the premise that, in normalcy and crisis, both sides retain a 
considerable contingent of strategic nuclear forces and systems of command and control over 
nuclear forces in a position that makes it possible to survive the first disarming strike from the 
opposite side, and to retaliate with destructive force against a wide range of vital targets.              
Moreover, they raise the question of reducing the number of targets subject to this attack risk.             
 The Russian side defines “strategic stability” as a stable balance of overall military potential, 
including both offensive and defensive weapons. This is an extremely broad definition. Russia 
calls for refraining from any steps in building up military potentials, weapons development and 
deployment, troop deployment, the adoption and implementation of doctrines and concepts, 
formation and reconfiguration of military-political alliances, establishing military bases in foreign 
territories, and other actions that the other side could perceive as a threat to its national security.                      
 They add that Russia will seek to involve other states, above all those with nuclear weapons, 
and those that have a stake in joint action to support security, in the process to build up strategic 
stability. The Russian side declares that any further steps in the area of nuclear weapons reduction 
and limitation should be multilateral.                                 
 Russia defines “strategic deterrence” as a set of measures intended to forestall or reduce any 
threat of destructive action from an aggressor state (or coalition of states). They add that nuclear 
deterrence is fundamental to maintaining strategic stability. Moreover, for the foreseeable future, 
nuclear weapons will remain an important factor in preventing emergence of nuclear conflicts and 
military conflicts involving conventional weapons that could be modified into nuclear ones. Under 
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its military doctrine, Russia asserts its right to use nuclear weapons to retaliate application of 
nuclear or other mass destruction weapons against it and/or its allies, and also in the event of 
conventional weapons used in an aggression against the Russian Federation that endangers the 
very survival of the state.                        
 The Russian side, therefore, states that further nuclear arms reduction should be considered 
taking due account of the broader combination of factors that are key to strategic stability. These 
include, but are not limited to, BMD, PGS, ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban 
Treaty, the threat of space-orbited weapons, and quantitative and qualitative imbalances in 
conventional weapons.                     
Problems 
 It is therefore clear that there are considerable differences in the U.S. and Russian approaches 
to strategic stability. This is due to asymmetry in their military potentials and their national security 
interests.                       
 The United States is prepared to opt for accords on nuclear weapons where the two countries 
have approximate parity. But Washington does not agree to rigid limitations in those areas where 
the United States has clear superiority. Moscow, meanwhile, is wary of threats to its nuclear 
potential from U.S. non-nuclear weapons and considers limitations in this area a priority.                     
 The United States adheres to a narrow interpretation of strategic stability, suggesting it should 
be supported by legally binding bilateral agreements on further nuclear arms reductions, and also 
by political, but not legal, measures to achieve a certain degree of transparency in such areas as 
BMD, PGS, aerospace devices, and cyber space. When it comes to multilateral accords, the U.S. 
position is limited solely to non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.                             
 Russia tends towards an extremely broad interpretation of strategic stability. Moscow is in no 
hurry to agree to new nuclear arms reductions, especially regarding tactical nuclear weapons 
(TNW). At the same time, the Russian side wants to achieve legally binding limitations on strategic 
non-nuclear military systems, an area in which it is lagging considerably behind the United States. 
Russia also advocates a military balance of forces established multilaterally under international 
law.                               
 There are influential political groups in both countries that, as a matter of principle, reject any 
need to support strategic stability through arms control accords. For example, the Republican 
Party’s stance leaves very little room for the ratification of a new disarmament treaty by the U.S. 
Senate. This further complicates diplomatic efforts to achieve a compromise acceptable to both 
Russia and the United States.                
                                                               Road Map 
 In order to analyze how the Russian-American dialogue on strategic stability can develop, we 
first need to understand whether the United States is prepared to conclude further legally binding 
agreements on strategic nuclear and non-nuclear arms control. If it is, then there are quite realistic 
prospects for strengthening strategic stability in both the narrow and broader senses. But, it is not, 
then strategic stability will start to erode. If no compromise is reached, arms control as a restraining 
mechanism could be consigned to “the dustbin of history.”  
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 It seems that the narrow interpretation of strategic stability that corresponded to the bi-polar 
world in the late 20th century, when there were two opposing superpowers, is now obsolete. The 
21st century requires a broader understanding of strategic stability that corresponds to today’s 
technological and geopolitical realities. Viewed conceptually, however, this issue requires serious 
analysis. Neither Russia nor the United States is currently prepared to seek political solutions 
covering all aspects of this broader interpretation of strategic stability.                     
 The shift from the outdated, narrow concept of strategic stability that dominated in the late 
20th century to a broader understanding that is relevant to today’s realities could involve several 
stages.         
 The initial stage could involve the examination of prospects for further bilateral nuclear arms 
reductions by the United States and Russia. One reason is that other nuclear powers have refused 
to undertake any official commitments to limit their arsenals. It is not clear how states that have 
nuclear weapons but that are not recognized under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
can be involved in the disarmament process.                               
 The second stage could involve the three other “officially recognized” nuclear powers – 
France, the UK and China – in the treaty regime. They would have to agree to some sort of 
quantitative ceilings on nuclear weapons and to measures of verification and control. Even the 
most optimistic assessments do not suggest that this could happen any sooner than the end of the 
decade.                             
 The third stage should involve efforts to include the “unofficial” nuclear powers – India, 
Pakistan, Israel and North Korea – in this nuclear arms control regime. But when and how this can 
be achieved is, for now, conjecture. This may require amendments to be made in the Non-
Proliferation Treaty itself, and this is fraught with extremely dangerous consequences.          
 We should also remember that all other nuclear powers don’t divide their nuclear arsenals 
into “strategic” and “non-strategic”.  That would make it difficult to find a common ground.                
New Approaches Needed 
 Further down the line, maintaining the military-strategic balance will necessitate some 
fundamentally new approaches to strategic offensive and defensive weapons. It would seem that 
in the 21st century, the arms control mechanism created during the Cold War based on legally 
binding accords (setting quantitative ceilings, and verification and control measures) is far from 
applicable when it comes to the possible regulation of the numerous components that comprise 
today’s military-strategic balance at both a bilateral and multilateral level.                          
 The traditional arms control mechanism can still be effective on nuclear weapons when it 
comes to Russia and the United States, as has been confirmed in the new START Treaty. That 
said, this mechanism does elide the two countries’ non-strategic nuclear weapons. Theoretically, 
it could be possible to achieve new legally binding accords between Russia and the United States 
on nuclear weapons. It is, however, highly unlikely that it will be possible to achieve a new legally 
binding agreement on limits to anti-ballistic missile defense (ABM-2 Treaty). It is even less 
possible, or indeed necessary, to revive the CFE Treaty, although efforts should continue to reach 
accords on a new framework of international legal control over conventional armaments that 
involves all European countries.          
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 Therefore, there is a clear need to develop new instruments to regulate the military-strategic 
balance and supplement preexisting legally binding accords. Supporting and strengthening the 
military-strategic stability is a process that should ensure the situation remains predictable, while 
also preventing any sudden shifts in the balance, ruling out unnecessary arms race expenditures, 
and forestalling the emergence and escalation of military-political crises.              
 These instruments could include confidence-building measures and enhanced transparency 
regarding particularly sensitive components of the military-strategic balance. The sides are surely 
aware of the need for restraint, and the importance of refraining from attempts to achieve 
superiority. As history indicates, this superiority is only ever fleeting in nature and risks igniting a 
new, and very dangerous, arms race.                           
 We can anticipate that these measures could include unilateral, parallel steps at a bilateral 
level (for example, between Russia and the United States. These measures could relate to both 
quantitative parameters of certain types of weapons and the supply of information regarding their 
operational application. These measures could be adopted via political accords, rather than legal 
commitments under a treaty.  
 Of course, the Russian-American accords on nuclear arms reductions cannot be regarded as 
sufficient to uphold the military-strategic balance if we accept the broad definition of strategic 
stability, which has to deal with both non-nuclear strategic systems and the multi-polar nature of 
the world today. It is particularly important to be aware the stability of the military-strategic 
balance will be increasingly influenced by the need to avoid or dis-incentivize the militarization 
of space and the development of cyber weapons. Obviously, supporting strategic stability in the 
multi-polar world in the 21st century will require new efforts to neutralize serious threats arising 
in these areas of military rivalry.     
 Strategic stability in the world and the situation in particular relating to European security, for 
the coming decade, will depend directly on whether Russia and the U.S. together with other NATO 
member countries are able to resolve the Ukrainian crises through an operational cooperation 
mechanism.       
Non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons 
There is a lot of discussion both in the U.S. and in Europe that Russia has a big advantage 
in this area. The Americans have 500 tactical nuclear warheads (200 out of them – in Europe). 
Russia, according to expert assessments, has about 2000. But there are important nuances here.  
Russia has three categories of non-strategic nuclear warheads: for ABM and air defense 
systems, naval nuclear weapons and, finally, air bombs and short-range missiles. The U.S. has 
only air bombs. But development of B-61 bombs will complicate the distinction between 
“strategic” and “non-strategic” nuclear weapons. 
The question is why should we count the Russian BMD and air defense nuclear warheads 
since they cannot be fired at Europe or other countries? The naval weapons are a special case: the 
U.S. has never agreed to limitations of naval weapons. The new SLCM developed by the U.S. is 
supposed to be dual capable. 
Besides many Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons are situated in Siberia and the Far 
East and are not intended for use in the European theater. 
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If we are talking about the nuclear balance in Europe between Russia and NATO, then it 
should be taken into account that three nuclear states are members of NATO. Therefore, the British 
and French potential should be accounted for, but Paris and London are not willing to agree to 
nuclear reductions.  
Why should not these issues be discussed in public? It could be proposed to launch 
negotiations on NATO’s and Russia’s nuclear arms in Europe, which do not fall under the START 
Treaty limitations, i.e. the U.S. tactical nuclear arms, as well as the British and French nuclear 
arms. Let NATO "squirm" and explain itself if Britain and France refuse to negotiate.  
The goal should be some more transparence and confidence-building, some parallel steps 
and exchange of information. But terrorist threat would limit the range of such measures. 
But legally binding obligations with on-site inspections seem impossible as long as there 
is no progress with other “baskets” of strategic stability. 
INF Treaty 
In the United States, the debate has been stirred up that Russia is preparing to withdraw 
from that Treaty in connection with its testing of the “Rubezh” rocket system, which is an ICBM, 
but of a shorter range (accordingly, it can strike targets in the European theater). In principle, the 
flight trajectory can be also reduced in American ICBMs and SLBMs. Another accusation is 
related to the range of the “Iskander” cruise missile. 
On the other hand Russia accuses the U.S. of several violations, including target-missiles, 
drones and Aegis Ashore. The U.S. Aegis Ashore missiles launchers MK-41 would be deployed 
in Poland and Romania. Offensive cruise and ballistic missiles can reach Moscow from Poland 
and Baltic states in a few minutes.  
The Special Verification Commission should resume its work, but some of the key issues 
will require direct involvement of top officials. 
The Collapse of the INF Treaty will jeopardize the implementation of the START Treaty 
and preclude any negotiations on NSNW. 
Missile Defense 
After its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002, the George W. Bush Administration 
started in 2004 the deployment of GBI strategic interceptors in Alaska and later – in California. 
However, to a significant extent this step was gambling. Most of 16 GBI system tests failed, even 
though they were conducted following a simplified pattern (the launch time and trajectory of the 
target were known in advance; no counter-measures were taken; and only one test carried out at 
night ended in failure). Later, the decision was made to equip this system with a new interception 
stage (CE-2).  
In 2015 the United States is intended to begin the deployment of 24 ground SM-3 
interceptors in Romania, and in 2018 – the same number in Poland. However, due to the cancelling 
by the Obama Administration of SM-3 Block 2B program, the U.S. will deploy in Eastern Europe 
the SM-3 Block 1B interceptors, and SM-3 Block 2А interceptors – in 2018.  
As to the land-based tactical and shorter-range interceptors Patriot PAC-3 и THAAD, their 
total number does not exceed 1000 units. Nevertheless, these systems cannot intercept the ICBMs 
and do not substantially affect the strategic military balance.  
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The Russian S-300, S-400 and S-500 and the U.S. Patriot PAC-3, THAAD, SM-3 Block 
1A, 1B and 2A missile air-defense systems will not substantially affect the strategic military 
balance between Russia and the United States.  
There are no prospects for signing a new ABM Treaty. However, due to the cancellation 
of the 4th Euro-BMD stage and abandoned plans to develop SM-3 Block 2B, the United States will 
have no more than 100 strategic interceptor missiles till the expiry of the START Treaty.  
In order to ensure predictability of the situation, to begin with, Moscow and Washington 
could agree on establishing a BMD cooperation center. This center could carry out a set of 
transparency measures: to hold technical briefings on performance characteristics of the existing 
and future BMD systems, and to submit annual reports on BMD systems. Besides, it would be 
possible to conduct joint BMD exercises such as computer simulation, table-top exercises, joint 
training involving Russian and U.S. BMD systems in the exercises, gathering and exchanging data 
obtained from radars and early warning satellites as well as sending information to command and 
control centers of Russia and the U.S.  
These arrangements could be recorded in an "Executive Agreement" (such a format was 
used together with the signing of the 1972 SALT Treaty).  
Meanwhile an agreement with Iran will undermine the pretext for Aegis Ashore in Europe. 
That will be interpreted as U.S. intention to use BMD against Russian ICBMs. 
High precision conventional weapons 
The new generation of non-nuclear long-range precision guided munitions can effectively 
target nuclear platforms and storage facilities.  
The signing of any agreements with the U.S. on banning the high-precision conventional 
weapons seems quite unlikely. The deployment of those weapons, carried by drones, tactical 
aircraft and missiles near Russia will make Moscow even more suspicious on transparency 
proposals.  
However, it could be proposed to the American side to limit the number of deployed long-
range high-precision systems such as "Prompt Global Strike"; to annually exchange plans for 
deployment of these systems (with the designation of their location); to confidentially notify one 
another prior to the use of these systems against the third countries.  
These arrangements can be recorded in the form of political declarations.  
It would also be appropriate to begin multilateral negotiations on the new all-European 
conventional arms control regime instead of CFE. The precision strike assets could also be covered 
along with tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters.  
Moreover, it can be proposed to the U.S. to start consultations on the new confidence-
building measures in the naval area. In particular, the issue could be raised on the need to provide 
information on prior notification of each other in case of the entry of surface ships or submarines 
in the water areas offshore the territory of the other party. This would allow us to reduce the threat 
for the strategic forces of Russia in the event of U.S. naval deployment of ships equipped with 
cruise missiles and SM-3 interceptors.  
Cyber security 
In the area of cyber security it is deemed appropriate to discuss with the U.S. the possibility 
of inviting other countries to join the Russian-American agreement on countering the cyber threats. 
This June Vladimir Putin and Barack Obama reached an unprecedented understanding on 
 62 
 
combating the cyber threats "to create a mechanism for information sharing in order to better 
protect critical information systems"15. This mechanism, when necessary, will engage the hotline 
that has been used by Moscow and Washington to prevent a nuclear conflict since 1963.  
It would also be useful to establish a permanent bilateral or multilateral cyber security 
threat reduction center.  
Space weapons 
At present, Russia and China are calling for elaboration of a treaty to ban the deployment 
of any weapons in outer space, and the European Union – for adopting a code of conduct in outer 
space. It seems appropriate to support the Code. Since the U.S. makes no haste to join the Code, 
this will put Washington in a complicated situation. It is necessary to bring our positions closer on 
the basis of a compromise: to adopt the Code of Conduct in Outer Space at the first stage (using 
the MTCR as a precedent) indicating that at the second stage (in the framework of the Conference 
on Disarmament in Geneva) talks will begin on drafting a treaty to ban deployment of any weapons 
in outer space. 
Moreover, it could be proposed to the U.S. side to come up with a joint statement that 
Russia and the U.S. do not intend to deploy any attack systems in outer space and to propose other 
countries including China to join this commitment.  
 
Preliminary Conclusions 
 We have to admit that although there are no ideological conflicts between Moscow and 
Washington today comparable to the confrontation economic and political systems in the Cold 
War period, and although the reset has made it possible to achieve accords on START, WTO and 
several other issues, Russian-American relations remained fragile and unstable. The Ukrainian 
crises provoked a new confrontation between Russia and The United States. MAD represents one 
of the “built-in” elements destabilizing these relations.              
 An analysis of approaches taken by Russia and the United States to the problem of strategic 
stability indicates that no radical improvements should be expected here in the short-term. While 
not denying the necessity and possibility of new accords on military-strategic issues, we have to 
conclude that new agreements on arms reductions and limitations cannot in themselves lead 
Moscow and Washington to Mutually assured security instead of MAD. But the arms control 
regime needs to be preserved to prevent further deterioration of Russian-Western relations.           
 Russia and the United States share common interests in their approaches to a host of key 
issues in international security. This primarily concerns non-proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction.                            
 In our opinion, qualitative changes in the political and economic spheres will also render 
inevitable the transformation of military-strategic interaction between Russia and the United 
States. Furthermore, both political and legal international approaches to coordinating the two 
sides’ positions are possible.        
 The military-to-military contacts which were cancelled because of the Ukraine crises should 
be immediately resumed and expanded.      
 Therefore, strategic stability in the 21st century could rest on the following pillars:  
 1. Treaty obligations on limitations and reductions in armaments.    
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 2. Confidence-building and transparency measures on the basis of political obligations.  
 3. Unilateral parallel measures to demonstrate the absence of threat.    
 4. Cooperation in the area of security and defense on the basis of reciprocal political and legal   
commitments, including those related to BMD.    

































































Session V: A World Without Tactical Nuclear Weapons? 
Nikolai Sokov 
 
There is nothing “magical” about TNW. They are legacy weapons inherited from the previous 
era: 
 Shorter-range delivery vehicles were the first to emerge – tactical (battlefield), theater, 
strategic. Simply a matter of progression of technology. 
 Embodiment of the time when nuclear use on the battlefield was regarded as little more 
than particularly powerful artillery.  
 
Doctrinal developments followed technology and perceptions of 1950s: doctrine did not drive 
weapons development; instead, weapons development drove doctrine. Hence, theoretically they 
can be disposed of if we decided to proceed from the doctrine. Impediments to elimination of 
TNW are political and psychological.  
 
Nuclear weapons are increasingly unusable – most action takes place well below the threshold. 
The short-range variety is also dangerous as they can be vulnerable (and thus can trigger early 
use) and more difficult to control in wartime (and thus favor delegation at an early stage of 
conflict). In peacetime, however, these weapons are pretty much useless because, under the 
conditions of very high nuclear threshold, long-range assets (strategic and theater) are more than 
sufficient for whatever role nuclear deterrence continues to play. 
 
In fact, it can be said that US has disposed of TNW considering that B-61s in Europe do not have 
a tangible military role and are intended for theater ranges. The status of TNW in Russia is also 
questionable: sea-launched TNW have intermediate ranges and the role of air-launched short-
range assets is uncertain; ground-based TNW have apparently been eliminated. The role of TNW 
is uncertain, but it will probably move in a similar direction. TNW are still very much valid in 
“new” NWS – India and Pakistan. Eventually they might prove the biggest obstacle to global 
elimination of these weapons. 
 
From the point of view of military roles and arms control process, we need to differentiate 
between three categories of the (excessively) broad category of TNW: short-range ground- and 
air-based weapons (the former do not exist in the United States and Russia), naval weapons, and 
intermediate-range (theater) weapons; some naval weapons have theater ranges, of course. The 
latter two categories appear to have some military utility (especially for Russia), so when we 
discuss the prospects of a TNW-free world, we are talking about the first category. The dangers 
and risks outlined above are also associated with short-range weapons. Below, the term TNW 
refers to these assets unless stated otherwise. 
 
As we contemplate the prospect of any arms control measures to TNW – even those short of 
reduction and/or elimination – we must admit that nothing is feasible as long as the current chill 
(or, more properly, major crisis) in Russia-West relations continues, which will likely continue 
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for several years. There is little new in the current arms control impasse – it has existed for years 
(since early 2000s and New START has not succeeded in reversing it) As far as TNW are 
concerned, there exists a Pareto-optimal political configuration: some members of NATO insist 
that US TNW should remain in Europe and Russia uses that as a pretext to refuse putting its 
TNW on the negotiating table. Breaking out of this configuration would require a major 
concession from one or the other side, but the security situation has never been sufficiently 
dangerous to force either party to invest political capital in such a concession. 
 
The continuing impasse should not prevent us from exploring possible options for way forward. 
As we do that, though, we should try to take into account the situation (military balance first of 
all) that could emerge several years from now instead of trying to fashion arms control initiatives 
proceeding from today’s context. 
 
Looking into the future, one should be more concerned about NATO nuclear deterrence (or, 
more precisely, US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe) than about Russian tactical nuclear 
weapons: it appears possible that NATO will in five or so years, if not earlier, busy itself with the 
question whether it needs to enhance reliance on nuclear weapons, including first and foremost 
TNW. 
 
The East-West military balance in Europe consists of three interrelated components – TNW and 
theater-range nuclear weapons, modern conventional strike assets, and air/missile defense assets. 
TNW attract most attention (Russian theater-range assets, such as nuclear-capable medium 
bombers or SLCMs with capability against land targets are routinely disregarded) and are often 
seen as a balance to the other two. This is probably not true in strictly strategic terms; yet, 
perceptions are a material force that affects arms control interactions. 
 
On the Russian side, the TNW posture will likely remain static and will perhaps continue to 
slowly shrink (like before, with the exception of the naval component, which is relatively 
independent of other categories of TNW). In contrast, Russia will continue to develop high-
precision conventional strike weapons and air/missile defense capability. While, at first glance, 
this bodes well for TNW arms control, this is not necessarily true. 
 
More than two decades ago the emergence of high precision conventional strike weapons 
reintroduced military power into international relations. Since the United States and the West in 
general have so far maintained a near-monopoly on these assets, they have not been subjected to 
arms control and have generally been regarded as a positive development to the extent that they 
represent an alternative to reliance on nuclear weapons. And, indeed, they have allowed deep 
reductions in nuclear weapons, including in the nuclear component of NATO deterrence in 
Europe (in fact, until recently complete withdrawal of US TMW remained feasible, if not likely). 
The role of modern conventional weapons as a substitute for nuclear deterrence can only remain 




The situation will change quite drastically when (hardly “if”) Russia obtains an operational 
modern conventional strike capability. It started to develop it in the early 2000s; the work 
noticeably accelerated after the 2008 war with Georgia, and although it is coming up slower than 
originally anticipated, progress has been very significant. That capability will without doubt be 
regarded by at least some members of NATO (especially those who insist on keeping at least 
some number of B-61s in Europe and who fear Russian traditional conventional capability) as a 
sign of increased threat because it is more usable and will give Russia a broader range of military 
and political options vis-à-vis NATO, especially if used in conjunction with and in support for 
what has recently been termed “hybrid warfare.”  
 
As a result, debate about proper relative weight of nuclear, conventional, and defense 
components of NATO’s security strategy will likely be reignited. One cannot rule out that some 
members of the Alliance will request greater reliance on nuclear weapons to balance the newly 
obtained Russian modern conventional capability and will ask the United States to increase its 
“nuclear presence” in Europe and perhaps also deploy these weapons closer to Russian borders. 
Russia will obviously respond in kind. This will trigger a combined nuclear-conventional arms 
race.  
 
In other words, today’s situation, although certainly not satisfactory, will likely become 
significantly less stable. The disagreements – perhaps even conflict – we see today over TNW 
will pale in comparison to a much more profound disagreement (or conflict) over modern 
conventional capability and its relationship to the remaining and perhaps somewhat growing 
nuclear capability. 
 
Seen from that perspective, the current preoccupation with TNW can be conceptualized as an 
opportunity rather than a problem: these weapons can be leveraged to extend arms control 
measures to modern conventional weapons and thus prevent an arms race and general instability 
in Europe. The only condition that has to be met – and it is perhaps the most challenging 
condition – is for the United States and NATO to recognize that their monopoly on high 
precision conventional weapons will not hold forever.  
 
The approach could work in stages. The first and probably the most important stage is to extend 
the Vienna Document to TNW, high-precision conventional strike weapons with theater ranges, 
and air/missile defense systems (starting with PAC-3 and S-300). Bringing them together under 
the same transparency umbrella is only logical – most delivery vehicles and platforms for high 
precision conventional weapons are dual capable, thus one cannot truly separate one from 
another.  
 
Exchange of information should include locations (weapons storages for TNW) and information 
about their movement. Since these are high-impact assets, the definition of “significant” should 
probably entail rather small quantities. Naval non-strategic weapons should be part of the regime 
and include notifications about patrol areas of ships and submarines with precision-guided 
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weapons on board. In many ways, transparency with regard to these assets will be more relevant 
for security in Europe than the current scope of the Vienna Documents. The regime would still 
be limited to Europe – similar assets in Asian part of Russia or in the United States would not be 
subject to its provisions except when relocated to Europe whether permanently or temporarily.  
With regard to global strike capability, on which both the United States and Russia work, a 
transparency regime should be applied globally. That is, coverage should be primarily 
determined by the range of relevant assets.  
 
The window of opportunity appears pretty narrow, however. It exists while Russia is still 
working on its modern conventional capability. Once that capability is fully operational (i.e., all 
elements are in place and are integrated within a single C3I system), Russia will likely lose 
interest in arms control measures for quite a long time.  
 
Once a transparency regime is put in place, it will be possible to eventually agree on arms 
control/limitation measures with regard to high precision conventional and air/missile defense 
capability. This is when TNW could be safely eliminated altogether.  
 
The same logic could apply to the Russia-China-India-Pakistan “chain.” Except, of course, it will 
be more difficult to negotiate because of the lack of experience in arms control and deep distrust 
among its members. 
 
Eventually, one can imagine military balance and mutual deterrence based on a combination of 
long-range (strategic and theater) nuclear weapons subject to a variety of treaties and regulated 
high precision conventional and air/missile defense assets. This model would be consistent with 
the reduced role of nuclear weapons: these can still have a role in deterring a major conflict 
whereas a better regulated balance in non-nuclear capability will help reduce the likelihood of 
escalation.  
 
The key condition is for the United States (Congress especially) to admit that monopoly on 
conventional strike and defense capability will not last. It is important to understand that 
inclusion of conventional and defense capability is not a concession to Russia but rather a means 
toward enhancing security when US monopoly will be lost. The task of convincing Congress, 
many in the government and in the expert community will be particularly difficult and probably 












Vienna Workshop Summary 
Vienna, October 6-7, 2014 
On October 6 and 7, 2014, eighteen American, Russian and European experts met to discuss the 
political and technical issues surrounding potential limits on non-strategic nuclear weapons 
(NSNW).  Although the conclusion of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) 
agreement led to hopes -- on the U.S. side at least -- that reductions in these weapons were next, 
the crisis in Crimea and Ukraine more broadly has effectively doused any interest on either side 
in moving forward.  Nonetheless, Track II discussions can provide an opportunity both for airing 
differences and discussing options for building confidence for the future. 
During the two-day meeting, a few major themes emerged: 
 Arms control might be easier in periods of trust, but during times of crisis, it can be a 
channel for easing tensions and establishing continuity of behavior when relations 
normalize.  Transparency can help build predictability and confidence. 
 That said, reductions of NSNW at this time are off the agenda: political issues with North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states are too thorny and Russia believes a 
new round of reductions unaccompanied by constraints in other areas such as Ballistic 
Missile Defense (BMD) and conventional strategic arms would not serve its national 
interests.  
 The Ukraine crisis is about European security, not about global security; no one should 
rush to the conclusion that the Cold War is back (for better or worse).   
 Further progress in arms control measures on NSNW will require better verification 
mechanisms, particularly for verifying numbers and types of warheads, which is a very 
difficult task.  Multilateral strategic arms control in the future will require talking about 
NSNW. 
 Political confidence and trust is paramount; the U.S. Congress could potentially be a 
roadblock, suggesting that further reductions will require close consultation with key 
Members of Congress.  On the Russian side, the focal point of behavior is the President, 
rather than the parliament.   
 A key verification issue is how to address locations outside of declared sites.  The 
technology has not quite developed yet to that point where that is possible.   
 Confidence-building measures could initially include lab-to-lab cooperation, limited data 
exchanges, exchanges of military officers, and military doctrinal talks. 
 Tangential opportunities for confidence-building could include broader discussions on 
European security and the use of other fora where U.S. and Russian leadership is needed 
(e.g., United Nations Security Council Resolution [UNSCR] 1540, Proliferation Security 









The Political Context 
Dr. Jeffrey McCausland and Gen. Evgeny Buzhinsky (Ret.) kicked off the discussion by drawing 
on points in their previously circulated discussion papers (see Appendix).  
 
McCausland noted the divergence in U.S. and Russian approaches to NSNW: for Russia, NSNW 
is an issue of national security whereas for the United States, it is tied to collective NATO 
strategy.  He doubted that the United States and Russia could find “a harmony of interest” on this 
topic but suggested that there might be some room for transparency-related measures.   
McCausland proposed four steps forward for the United States and Russia: 
1. Recognize that this is not a new Cold War and that the United States and Russia share 
common threats from global instability. 
2. Resolve questions concerning the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). 
3. Continue implementing New START.  
4. End the crisis in Ukraine.   
Dr. McCausland described the unilateral steps that the West had taken in response to the crisis in 
Crimea, including deployment of the NATO rapid response force, support for the B-61 nuclear 
bomb, deployment of F-35 aircraft to Europe and the life extension of the Tornado by Germany, 
resurrection of discussions for phased array Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), and pressure to 
provide military assistance.  These are contrary to Russian interests but are a consequence of 
Moscow’s recent actions.  At the same time, McCausland suggested that participants recognize 
the value of the arms control process.  Even during the worst days of the Cold War, the U.S. and 
USSR kept communications open, allowing for a baseline of progress once relations improved.  
McCausland suggested the following areas for potential cooperation: 
 Military doctrinal discussions, given the changes during a decade of war;  
 Implementation of UNSCR 1540 to seek greater efforts to reduce the possibility of 
existing weapons or fissile material falling into the hands of non-state actors.  US and 
Russian cooperation and leadership in this effort is key;  
 On-site security improvements (including joint threat assessments, safeguarding 
arsenals, joint recovery exercises, and nuclear accident/incident response);  
 Seeking to improve/maintain arms control agreements such as the Vienna Document and 
Open Skies.   
 
Gen. Buzhinsky disagreed with McCausland's description of Crimea, suggesting that the 
European Union and the United States had encouraged a coup which overthrew the legally 
elected government in Ukraine.  He also noted that many of the unilateral steps described by Dr. 
McCausland were already underway before the crisis in Crimea.  Buzhinsky suggested that 
Russia has made many more unilateral compromises on its national security interests in arms 
control agreements than the United States. In his view, only SALT I, SALT II and the Prague 
treaty paid equal attention to Russian national security interests. Further, he noted that when the 
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Soviet Union signed the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the West was 
concerned about Russia's conventional superiority (10:1), but now NATO has the upper hand 
(3:1 superiority).  He noted that the INF Treaty limited Russia's land-based missiles, which 
constituted its strength, but did not limit U.S. submarine-launched missiles.   
Gen. Buzhinsky reiterated the Russian concern that BMD in Europe are aimed at defending 
against Russian strategic forces, rather than a handful of future Iranian missiles.  An American 
participant suggested that if we all agreed that BMD could not defend against a massive nuclear 
strike, then it was clear that NATO’s missile defenses were not erected against Russian nuclear 
forces. Gen. Buzhinsky stated that Russia perceives U.S. BMD not as a means to defend against 
a massive Russian attack, but as a defense against the few survived Russian strategic missiles 
launched in a retaliatory attack after an initial U.S.-NATO conventional disarming strike against 
Russian nuclear forces.  He also noted that not all NATO members perceive the EPAA program 
as being directed against Iran.   
Gen. Buzhinsky suggested that concern with agreements such as CFE, the Vienna Document and 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is misguided.  The CFE treaty 
was signed by blocs of countries that don't exist anymore. As for the Vienna Document, Russia 
does not conduct exercises with other countries anymore, so notifications are moot.  A new CFE 
treaty might be possible, but it would need to cover 21st century armaments like drones, cruise 
missiles, and aircraft and such an agreement would be difficult to reach.  Gen. Buzhinsky 
thought the "alleged violations" of the INF Treaty would blow over. 
With regional nuclear weapon states on its borders (China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea) 
Russia can ill-afford to limit its NSNW, according to Buzhinsky.  For Russia, NSNW constitute 
regional nuclear deterrence.  However, Buzhinsky noted that if a miracle were to occur, 
confidence building measures (CBMs) related to NSNW could help restore US-Russian 
relations.  The place to start would be mutual declarations of the total numbers of such weapons. 
In general, participants agreed that transparency within arms control agreements could add to 
predictability and hence build confidence.  One Russian participant suggested a 4-stage process 
that would include 1) an exchange of science data on the NSNW that were destroyed under the 
Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs), and numbers and locations of current NSNW; 2) 
consultations and unilateral initiatives without verification measures; 3) consultation on 
agreements with partial verification; and 4) a treaty. 
An American participant acknowledged Russia's very different set of threats and the 
deterioration of its conventional weapons that have given NSNW a greater role in Russian 
military doctrine.  In some respects, Russia is in a similar position to NATO in the early days of 
the Cold War.  The U.S. and Russia need a broader strategic dialogue and a vision/framework in 
which to operate.  This could be an appropriate use for Track II dialogues.  
Another American participant acknowledged that Russia's challenges along its periphery are 
significant, but approaches for handling them can have unintended consequences.  Would Russia 
prefer the risk of the United States introducing nuclear weapons?  Or the risk of regional partners 
developing and deploying nuclear weapons?  The United States and Russia share common 
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interests in reducing proliferation risks, terrorism risks and political turmoil.  Reducing risks will 
require greater cooperation, shoring up alliances and helping provide missile defenses.  These 
nuclear weapons require a global solution because geographical solutions to bigger problems are 
not helpful. 
One participant suggested that the United States and Russia are at the end of traditional arms 
control, which is why several of the treaties are falling apart.  A new framework needs to 
improve predictability and transparency.  Ideally, this would allow for transitioning to long-range 
conventional capabilities, but would also include an intermediate-range capability for Russia.  If 
the treaty-limited items are not delivery systems but stockpiles, should we really worry so much 
about numbers if there is sufficient transparency?  Enhancing the predictability of the capabilities 
of ballistic missile defenses is a key part of this management strategy.  
One U.S. participant doubted that the United States and Russia would have made much progress 
on NSNW reductions even without the ongoing crisis in Ukraine and Crimea, because of the 
array of underlying differences.  Russia’s actions in Crimea, however, have evaporated the U.S. 
willingness to undertake unilateral actions.  Although Russia has stated it would like to pursue 
multilateral nuclear arms control, this cannot be done without U.S.-Russian bilateral cooperation. 
Finally, NATO’s position on NSNW has not changed on the surface, but attitudes have shifted 
from reducing reliance on nuclear weapons to increasing reliance on them.  According to one 
European participant, the following actions will be important: 1) Reestablish informal 
mechanisms for crisis prevention; 2) Preserve what we have established via treaties, e.g., the 
Russia-NATO Council; 3) Try to move sideways, for example on doctrine, safety, security issues 
that are not directly related to strategic stability and which both sides should be able to support; 
and finally, 4) address the weapons themselves. 
Lessons of Arms Control 
Dr. Ronald Lehman spoke on the lessons of earlier arms control in thinking about future limits 
on NSNW.  Technically speaking, the United States and Russia have already done NSNW arms 
control, having concluded the INF Treaty.  However, some of the assumptions about verifying 
the INF Treaty may have been wrong.  Definitional issues (what is strategic versus non-strategic; 
what is adequate versus effective verification) and counting rules can change over time.  The key 
objective is to reduce uncertainty.  As the number of strategic weapons moves lower, there will 
be a greater need for precision regarding NSNW and this is a difficult challenge.  The U.S. and 
Russia have skirted this issue for many years because it’s hard technically and politically.  The 
solution is not to settle for politically expedient (and thus dilute) verification, but to address the 
hard challenges.   
 
The Verification Context 
Participants debated the difficulty of verifying NSNW.  On the one hand, most acknowledged 
that verification would have to be far more intrusive than has been the case thus far.  In the 
words of one participant, "It doesn't approach what has been done under strategic nuclear 
weapons treaties."  On the other hand, verifying NSNW could be like verifying reserves of 
strategic warheads because they are separated from delivery systems.  At declared sites, 
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verification is not that hard, but verification becomes much more difficult outside of declared 
sites. 
 
One participant suggested that focusing on high standards of verification for NSNW would be 
contrary to NATO's earlier approach on this issue, which was to pick the "low-hanging fruit." 
Ms. Nancy Jo Nicholas presented an overview of the contributions of science and technology to 
technical verification.  She highlighted the major challenges: evaluating the material presented 
(measurement), protecting the host country's classified information (certification), allowing for 
independent confirmation and establishing a chain of custody.  She noted that in previous arms 
control agreements, parties have not always agreed to limits that they could already verify (e.g., 
the Limited Test Ban Treaty) but that the time horizon for developing technologies is fairly long.  
That said, some tools being considered for NSNW verification focus on one element of the 
verification mission and exploit technologies developed for other programs.  These may include 
non-destructive assay techniques for warhead measurements, information barriers and template 
matching for warhead verification, layered sensors and remote monitoring (e.g., muon 
radiography) for facility monitoring, crowd-sourcing for data assessment, quantum cryptography 
for data authentication, and portal monitoring, tags and seals for chain of custody.  One 
participant suggested that these techniques focused on verifying declared items but that NSNW 
verification would also have to provide confidence in the absence of undeclared activities outside 
of declared sites.   
Dr. Eugene Miasnikov presented his views on the two major current obstacles to NSNW 
reductions: the lack of interest by Russia and the development of precision-guided weapons.  
Miasnikov suggested that the West can now provide few incentives to Russia and that the 
arguments made by the West for reductions are unconvincing (e.g., arguments about the safety 
and security of non-deployed warheads).  Instead, Russia has explicitly linked NSNW reductions 
to progress in other areas like BMD, space, and a European security architecture.  Miasnikov 
suggested that NSNW CBMs could be a “sweetener” (“makeweight”) for other deals that Russia 
wants.  On precision-guided weapons, Miasnikov noted that their unrestricted development poses 
a fundamental problem, since these weapons are often perceived as a substitute for nuclear 
weapons.  He noted that the deployment of modern conventional precision arms (both offensive 
and defensive) will make nuclear weapons unnecessary and therefore expendable, but will also 
be perceived as a new threat and will therefore reduce incentives for further nuclear cuts. 
Russian participants questioned why the United States couldn’t provide extended deterrence with 
its strategic weapons to NATO as it has done in other regions of the world.  U.S. and European 
participants responded that nuclear weapons play an important burden-sharing role within NATO 
and noted the importance of U.S. nuclear consultations with allies, partly because of the 
consensus decision-making process in NATO.  That said, some participants conjectured that if 
U.S. nuclear weapons were not already on NATO territory, few would be arguing to deploy or 






Participants split up into three smaller groups to discuss how they would approach political 
confidence-building measures, technical confidence-building measures, and tangential 
opportunities (unrelated to NSNW) to build confidence between the United States and Russia.  
 
Political CBMS 
Some of the feasible options to improve political confidence discussed by this group included:  
1. Data exchange historical from PNI (numbers, types, etc. Not %) 
2. Data on current NSNW stockpile (number, types, including those awaiting dismantlement, 
active, and not deployed) 
3. Increased exchange of military officers/visits 
4. Better cooperation on UNSCR 1540 
5. Reinvigorate Open Skies as a policy tool and Vienna Document for 21st century 
6. Military doctrine talks 
7. Political pledge for no increase in NSNF 
9. Improved transparency (but no specific ideas) 
10. Retain portions of the bilateral presidential commission 
 
They agreed that there were certain CBMs that would not be possible, including reaffirming 
what have become known as the “Three Nos” (that NATO members have no intention, no plan 
and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members), reaffirming the 
Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, pledging not to modernize capabilities, considering geographic 
constraints as a solution and discussions about reducing NSNW.   
Technical CBMs 
This group explored unilateral, bilateral and multilateral technical CBMs.  They concluded that 
multilateral measures were the toughest (e.g. P-5 transparency talks) but that measures involving 
a third party (e.g., Norway or the IAEA) hold the possibility for deflecting criticism.  Bilateral 
CBMs were considered problematic for the moment.  Unilateral measures were possible (e.g., 
warhead measurement campaigns) but were unlikely to be focused enough to bring real 
confidence with regard to verifying NSNW reductions.  The group assumed that the current 
political climate would make specific technical CBMs difficult, but that softening the focus 
(away from NSNW-specific, verification-specific, U.S.-Russian specific) could help. 
 
Ideas for near-term implementation included public, bilateral exchange of data on all nuclear 
weapons (strategic, NSNW, deployed, reserve, awaiting destruction), visits to former storage 
sites in Europe, experts’ visit to prepare for verification, and an  international commission on 
verification of fissile material/reinvigorating the Trilateral Initiative. 
Ideas for long-term implementation, which focused on technology development, included 
focusing on cross cutting technologies that serve more than one purpose (e.g., information 
transmission security; data storage; information barriers; storage security), softening the focus 
away from verification (e.g. military doctrine talks, not just on nuclear [with military staff to 
keep it technically focused]), involving a third party, and seeking to characterize efforts as 
contributing to other purposes – e.g. nuclear security, Pu management.  The group agreed that 
any technical CBMs would have to be articulated carefully in order to find a theme that works 
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for both: in United States, “nuclear security” is popular; in Russia, cooperative threat reduction is 
anathema. 
Tangential opportunities 
This group concluded that the United States and Russia need to engage in a broader discussion 
about European security and European security architecture.  This cannot now be conducted 
among governments, given the current political environment, but Track II efforts could be the 
appropriate vehicle to engage on these topics and provide a basis for discussion when formal 
government to government talks resume.  This group agreed that Russia had often been excluded 
from discussions (e.g., missile defense) and that there has to be some understanding that Moscow 
will be included in the future. 
 
Track I efforts must focus on crisis prevention, while Track II could focus on ideas for 
addressing limits on conventional military technology and capacity.  A primary objective today 
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Introduction 
All 21st century policymakers would agree that any nation's strategy must focus on national 
interests and be built on three variables.  First, what are the "ends" of strategy or the goals the 
nation is trying to accomplish alone or in concert with friends and allies?  Second, what are the 
"ways" or policies that are formulated in order to move the nation in the direction of a better 
future?  And finally, what are the "means" or resources available to the government of any nation 
that can be devoted to securing these objectives, and how can they be husbanded in a fashion to 
maximize their potential? 
The United States and the Russian Federation have been involved in numerous arms control 
negotiations with the goal of furthering their respective national interests.  Such discussions and 
the subsequent agreements are the "ways" of policy.  Following the signing of the New START 
treaty both Moscow and Washington indicated that the next area of armament to be considered 
for potential reductions might be so-called non-strategic nuclear forces (NSNF).  These forces 
include short-range missiles (below the limits imposed by the INF Treaty) and bombs designed 
to be delivered by tactical aircraft. 
This paper will examine the political context for discussions on limitations with respect to NSNF 
and related areas for potential cooperation between the United States and Russian Federation.  
Clearly, relations between US (as well as its NATO partners) and Russia have deteriorated over 
the past year, and this makes any progress on this issue difficult.  Consequently, the obstacles to 
initiating talks and prospects for success will be considered as well as making policy 
recommendations.   
Factors affecting future efforts 
Since the beginning of 2014 events such as the Russian annexation of Crimea, the apparent 
shooting down of a Malayan Airliner by so-called Ukrainian dissidents equipped with weapons 
supplied by the Russian Federation, and Moscow’s continued violations of Ukrainian 
sovereignty have all placed a chill on relations between Moscow and the West.   
 
Discussions concerning NSNF were already complicated by a number of factors prior to the 
onset of the Ukraine crisis.  The failure to bring into effect the Adapted Treaty on Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe (ACFE) and Moscow’s suspension of participation in the existing treaty 
underscored the connection between conventional and nuclear forces.  It also caused many in the 
West to question whether Russia’s current leadership considered arms control a useful policy 
tool.    
                                                 
40 This is a draft publication that was prepared for a workshop sponsored by the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP) in Vienna, 
Austria from 6-7 October, 2014.  It is not to be cited or reproduced without the express permission of the author. 
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Furthermore, Western policymakers had also become increasingly concerned about possible 
Russian violations of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.41   This agreement 
was signed in 1988 prohibiting the production or testing of surface-to-surface or cruise missiles 
with a range of 500 to 5500 kilometers.  Charges have circulated for nearly two years that Russia 
has been testing an intermediate range cruise missile (referred to as the R-500), which would be 
a violation of treaty provisions.  The State Department’s Annual Arms Control Compliance 
Report to Congress released this summer reported Russia to be in violation of the treaty.  As a 
result, both Russian and Western security experts have argued that the current climate is 
reminiscent of the worst days of the Cold War.   
The West has responded to Moscow’s aggression in Ukraine with an array of economic 
sanctions.  Furthermore, it seems extremely likely that the following additional measures will 
take or at least considered.  All may serve to further complicate any possibility of serious 
discussions on NSNF, and Russian responses are likely: 
 NATO will develop and begin the deployment of a Rapid Response Force to Eastern 
European members to provide a “persistent” presence. 
 The United States will continue the development and eventual deployment of a new 
B61 bomb to replace its existing NSNF arsenal in Europe.  
 Alliance members will maintain if not accelerate their purchase of the F35 aircraft from 
the United States to include a version designed for tactical nuclear delivery.  Germany 
will continue a life extension program for its existing Tornado aircraft that will allow 
them to be used for the delivery of the B61 thru 2030. 
 Defense policymakers in Europe and the United States are likely to resurrect 
discussions concerning the development and deployment of a phased array anti-ballistic 
missile defense shield for NATO members. 
 If the crisis in the Ukraine persists there will be growing pressure on Western leaders to 
provide direct military assistance to the Kiev government.   
 
Is there a way forward? 
Despite the current challenges, it is important to recall that the West conducted discussions with 
the Soviet Union at some of the worst moments during the Cold War such as in the aftermath of 
the invasion of Czechoslovakia or the quelling of the Solidarity movement in Poland.  
Furthermore, this is not the Cold War.  Moscow has clearly violated international norms and 
challenged the very fundamentals of the international system.  While the seriousness of the 
current situation cannot be ignored, Russia does not appear to be motivated by a global, 
expansionist ideology as the Soviet Union maintained for over forty years.  Both the United 
States and Russia do not maintain their strategic nuclear forces on “hair trigger” alert, and the US 
has dramatically reduced not only its tactical nuclear forces from Europe but also its 
conventional forces.  Furthermore, Washington and Moscow have common interests that 
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encourage cooperation.  Examples include the elimination of the Syrian chemical arsenal, the 
threat posed by global terrorism, and growing instability in East as well as South Asia.  
However an agreement focused on actual NSNF reductions would appear unlikely at least in the 
near term.  Still there remain a range of actions that must be taken to insure relations do not 
deteriorate further.  In addition, there are potential restraints directly related to NSNF as well as 
other efforts to enhance transparency or predictability that could be useful.  Discussions in these 
areas should be pursued. Incremental success in them may assist in developing momentum and 
helping to reestablish trust that has been damaged by events over the past year.  They could 
include the following:   
 Resolve the issues concerning alleged Russian violations of the INF Treaty.  It is in 
the interest of both Russia and the United States to move as quickly as possible to 
resolve the questions concerning the R-500 cruise missile.  The Special Verification 
Commission established by the INF Treaty should be convened to address this issue.   
 
 Continued implementation by both sides of New START.  It is critically important that 
both sides continue their strict adherence to the provisions of this agreement.  This is 
not only fundamental to any chance for improved relations but also remains in the 
best interests of both nations.   
 
 Initiate military doctrinal talks.  Such talks are a formal exchange of views by 
military officers and experts to enhance both understanding and transparency.  They 
do not seek to negotiate an agreement.  They should be focused on the size of the 
respective NSNF stockpiles for both nations and how they fit into the overall 
framework of each country’s national security strategy and emerging military 
doctrines.  Such talks have been conducted four times in the past.  The most recent 
was held in The Hague in June 2013.  Still these discussions have been only on an ad 
hoc basis, and some experts have argued that they lacked continuity.42  Regular 
sessions could be established using the framework of the NATO-Russia Council.  
 
 Commence discussions on further implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 
1540. The United States and Russian Federation were sponsors for this resolution that 
was agreed upon in 2004. All states have three primary obligations under UNSCR 
1540 relating to nuclear weapons and material: (1) prohibit support to non-State 
actors seeking such items; (2) adopt and enforce effective laws prohibiting the 
proliferation of such items to non-State actors, and prohibiting assisting or financing 
such proliferation; and to take and enforce effective measures to control these items, 
in order to prevent their proliferation, as well as to control the provision of funds and 
services that contribute to proliferation.   
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Continued implementation of these actions will significantly strengthen the 
international standards relating to the export of sensitive items and support for 
proliferators (including financing) and ensure that non-state actors, including terrorist 
and black-market networks, do not gain access to chemical, nuclear or biological 
weapons, their means of delivery or related materials. Obviously, this is a goal shared 
by both nations that has only been underscored over the past few months with the 
emergence of ISIL as a major threat to international peace and security.  The relative 
size of most non-strategic nuclear warheads, their number, and site dispersal make 
their vulnerability a point of concern.  American and Russian leadership in this area 
continues to be critical in the continued fulfillment of the goals established in this 
resolution.   
 
 Conduct further discussions on site security improvements.  The United States and 
Russia, drawing in part on their Cooperative Threat Reduction experiences and 
working through the NATO-Russia Council, should exchange ideas on how to further 
improve security for nuclear storage sites.  This could include some or all of the 
following:  (1) conduct a joint threat assessment of the risk of terrorists or other 
nonstate actors penetrating a storage site and gaining access to nuclear weapons; (2) 
joint security assessment of how site security might be improved to guard against 
such risks to include improved.  Both sides should present current techniques, 
technologies and procedures for storage, intrusion detection alarms, exterior site 
security, and better methods for enhanced personnel reliability; and (3) a recovery 
exercise in which U.S./NATO and Russian forces might work together to recover 
stolen nuclear weapons or fissile material. The United States and Russia could also 
discuss standards for use-control features on nonstrategic nuclear warheads.  This 
could also include expanded joint nuclear accident/incident response tabletop and 
"live" exercises.43 
 
 Offer Russian and US assistance to other areas potentially threatened by nuclear 
instability.  The United States and Russia have the longest bilateral history of arms 
control discussions in history.  Consequently, we share the greatest experience in 
determining how arms control fits in the continued development of our national 
security strategy as well as the best overall understanding of the connection between 
conventional and nuclear forces.  This arms control history coupled with our roles as 
the two largest nuclear powers on the planet imply a global leadership responsibility.   
Leaders in both Moscow and Washington must acknowledge that decisions they 
make with respect to their NSNF stockpiles reverberate across the international 
community and affect other nations’ security concerns.   
 
The world is witnessing increased instability in two areas – the Korean peninsula and 
South Asia. In both places large conventional armed forces confront each other over 
heavily fortified borders.  Both sides either possess nuclear weapons, a nuclear 
patron, or the ability to develop weapons.  Bilaterally or through the NATO-Russian 
Council they should offer their expertise and assistance in promoting arms control 
discussions and improved nuclear security.  The goal would be to assist the countries 
                                                 
43 Durkalec and Zagorski, pp. 21-22. 
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involved to lower tensions and improve crisis management while reducing the 
possibility of a nuclear weapon falling into the hands of a terrorist organization.      
 
 Seek to improve and maintain existing arms control agreements such as the Vienna 
Document and Open Skies. As previously mentioned, there is a close relationship 
between conventional force imbalances and the development of NSNF’s.  It is 
extremely unlikely, however, that NATO and Russia will resolve their differences 
concerning the Adapted CFE Treaty that would allow it to enter into force and Russia 
resume compliance.  Still improvements may be feasible for the Vienna Document 
and Open Skies that over time may establish conditions for resolving these 
differences and make reductions in non-strategic nuclear forces feasible.  
 
Conclusions 
Both Washington and Moscow (as the largest nuclear powers) have unique responsibilities as 
well as an opportunity to provide leadership.  Relations have clearly deteriorated dangerously, 
and the level of mistrust cannot be underestimated.  Still Russia and the US have not yet returned 
to the depths of the Cold War, and the causes for renewed tensions are significantly different.  
Furthermore, the nature of emerging threats may still make cooperation feasible while also being 
consistent with each nation’s respective national interests.  
 
But these efforts do not occur in isolation or in a policy vacuum.  Though the focus of any 
negotiation may well be the details of a prospective agreement, the process must always be 
consistent with the direction of national or alliance security strategy.  For the United States this 
implies that any discussions concerning NSNF must be made with due consideration to the 
impact upon NATO.  Security experts in Moscow must understand that the recent aggression 
against Ukraine has raised real concerns about the sovereignty and security of those NATO 
countries that share borders with the Russian Federation.   
 
In addition, domestic events, other issues between states, the bureaucratic process of the 
participating parties, and the state of existing agreements have a direct bearing on the feasibility 
of any negotiations as well as the prospects for success.  Over the past year some American 
policymakers have begun to question whether a "harmony of interests" still can be found 
between the US and Russia with respect to European security.  Others have argued that Moscow 
is no longer a reliable negotiating partner.  As a result, three things are critical if we are going to 
halt the further deterioration of relations and set the stage for cooperation, even in the areas 
described in this paper: (1) an end to the crisis between Russia and Ukraine; (2) resolution of 
alleged Russian violations of the INF Treaty; and (3) continued full implementation of the New 
START agreement.  
 
Finally, many noted historians have argued that the immediate cause of World War I was the 
decision by European leaders to begin mobilizing their armies.  This caused a chain reaction as 
potential adversaries reacted to avoid being vulnerable to attack.  It is impossible to calculate 
whether arms control negotiations or discussions over common interests might have provided 
sufficient restraints during those tense moments in the autumn of 1914 and precluded conflict.  
But all nations should acknowledge that arms control is a tool of policy and not altruism, and that 
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cooperation is in service of finding an appropriate security balance consistent with national 
interests and within a continually changing security environment. 
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The Russian Political and Security Context for Limits on Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons1 
 
By Evgeny Buzhinsky 
Senior Vice President 
PIR Center 
Discussions on non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons (NSNW) have been very active for the 
last four years. Experts at various conferences and seminars have been trying to formulate a 
possible compromise for involving this class of nuclear weapons into arms control consultations 
(or better – negotiations). Of course, the main object of the above mentioned discussions is the 
Russian arsenal of NSNW. Just nine months ago there was a possibility that some kind of 
compromise may be found and Russian position on NSNW, at least as regards some 
transparency and confidence building measures (CBMs), may change in the nearest future. The 
change might’ve happened not because of the alleged “disparity of the western non-strategic 
nuclear arsenals with the greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons” or 
“disparity between the NSNW stockpiles of the Russian Federation and the United States” which 
is true if only NSNW are counted. 
Taking into consideration the difference in perceptions on the use of nuclear weapons between 
Russia and the U.S.  It is more fair to assess the entire nuclear potentials of these countries 
(Russia has approximately 4300 strategic and non-strategic warheads, both operationally 
deployed and in storage, the U.S. – approximately 4760 ones).  
The change in Russian position might’ve happened because of Moscow’s long-standing policy of 
keeping nuclear non-proliferation agenda “on the table” especially in view of the coming NPT 
Review Conference next year and an unwillingness to go further down on strategic offensive 
weapons’ numbers. Unfortunately  as a consequence of the current crisis in the relationship 
between Russia and the United States there seems to be little chance for the resumption of 
bilateral talks on the next round of nuclear force reductions in the nearest future. Taken into 
account the fact that NATO has decided to suspend all practical cooperation with Russia, any 
hopes of the Alliance reaching out to Moscow to discuss transparency and confidence-building 
measures (let alone reductions) for NSNW arsenals any time soon are also unrealistic.   
Although no official data on Russian stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons was ever published, 
Russia is believed to have in its disposal an estimated 2000 deliverable non-strategic nuclear 
warheads. These include cruise missiles of various ranges, gravity bombs, torpedoes and depth 
charges. Since mid-90-s all of Russia’s non-strategic weapons are in central storage (in the sites 
operated by the 12th Main Directorate of MOD) and are not deployed with delivery vehicles. 
The political crisis that erupted in Ukraine in early 2014 has ended the period in Russian-
Western relations that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The crisis marks the end of 
a generally cooperative phase in those relations, which even included a failed effort of Russia’s 
                                                 
1
This is a draft publication that was prepared for a workshop sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS) at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP) in Vienna, Austria from 6-7 
October, 2014.  It is not to be cited or reproduced without the express permission of the author. 
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integration with or into the West on its own terms. Instead, the Ukraine crisis has opened a new 
period of heightened rivalry, even confrontation, between former Cold War adversaries. It has a 
traditional military dimension too, but this aspect is not, as yet, dominant. 
To better understand why the Russian leadership has been consistently unwilling to start any 
arms control discussion on NSNW for many years, it is necessary to define the place of   this 
class of weapons in the Russian military strategy.  And definition is – critical.  
Under present circumstances NSNW are practically the only means of securing Russia’s 
independence and territorial integrity. According to Russian military strategy nuclear forces have 
two types of missions: traditional strategic deterrence, which relies primarily on strategic 
weapons, and limited use in response to a large-scale conventional attack. Both missions are 
reflected in the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation which says that nuclear weapons 
may be used: 1) “as a response to the use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass 
destruction against the Russian Federation and/or its allies”; 2) “as a response to a large scale 
conventional aggression in the situations critical to the national security of the Russian 
Federation”.  
The main reason for Russia’s need for longer-range non-strategic nuclear weapons stems from 
the fact that long-range precision-guided conventional weapons provide a key advantage for the 
United States and NATO. To counter this Russia works hard to acquire similar long-range 
conventional strike assets and in the meantime relies on limited nuclear use, employing nuclear 
weapons of comparable ranges. The Russian Navy, which due to its modern size cannot yet 
compete conventionally with the navies of the world major naval powers, attaches particular 
importance to non-strategic nuclear weapons, because of the experience of all the latest military 
conflicts in which the main strikes were delivered by cruise missiles from surface ships and 
submarines as well as naval aviation. 
Russian and US/NATO rationales for maintaining non-strategic nuclear weapons differ. 
US/NATO sees their value largely in political terms: that is, providing a security link between 
the United States and Europe and serving as an element of NATO’s nuclear capability. Many 
military experts agree that the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons (B61 nuclear bombs now stored in 
several European countries)  have very little concrete value as a real deterrent in today’s or 
tomorrow’s Euro-Atlantic security space, in particular when the strategic forces of the United 
States, Great Britain and France remain visible and credible in any NATO context. The latest 
deployment by the U.S. in June this year of three B-52H and two B-2 strategic bombers to 
Europe  demonstrated its readiness to use strategic bombers to reinforce regional deterrence and 
if there is  a need to replace by them Dual Capable aircraft in regional contingencies.    
Russia attaches more military significance to its non-strategic nuclear weapons. It sees those 
weapons as offsetting a conventional force disadvantage vis-à-vis its neighbors, serving as a 
force enhancer should conventional defense fail, and offering possibilities to escalate or to 
control escalation. Moreover Russia considers its tactical nuclear weapons as a counterbalance to 
the nuclear forces of third countries, nuclear capabilities of practically all of which are able to 
reach the territory of Russia. Reduction of Russian strategic nuclear potential in accordance with 
 88 
 
the bi-lateral treaties with the USA relatively increases the role of Russian tactical nuclear 
weapons for the purpose of containment of the nuclear countries of Eurasia. So NSNW in Russia 
are considered to be the main means of regional deterrence. 
As it was mentioned above,  today  and in the nearest future it is highly unrealistic to speak about 
continuation of productive dialogue between Russia and the USA/NATO on any arms control 
subject including missile defense, conventional forces in Europe, weaponisation of space and 
non-strategic nuclear weapons. Moreover, any limitations and reductions of Russian stockpiles 
of NSNW will be unrealistic to expect even if the current crisis is settled down and the West-
Russian relations are back to a more or less normal status again. 
Nevertheless, sooner or later the armed conflict in Ukraine will be over and political settlement 
will be reached. Then the issue of normalizing relations between Russia and the USA/NATO 
will again become relevant, although I suspect they will not return to the “business as usual” 
level for a relatively long time.  
Even during the best periods in the relations between Russia and the West after the end of the 
Cold War there was obvious lack of mutual trust. That lack of trust was especially evident in 
arms control sphere (missile defense, conventional forces, NSNW). Today the level of mutual 
trust is at its lowest point. But even during the Cold War times, the arms control agenda was one 
of the few areas of mutual interest where the Soviet Union and the United States managed to 
reach mutually beneficial compromises.    
And how strange it may sound that one of the ways to start restoring that trust may be the 
beginning of consultations on transparency and confidence-building measures (CBMs) with 
regards to NSNW, the most difficult and at the same time the most worrisome item of the arms 
control agenda.       
There are a number of such possible CBMs intended to create transparency and build (restore) 
trust between Russia and the USA that could be agreed upon. 
Greater Transparency. Russia and the United States both have a good idea of the 
locations where the other stores its nuclear warheads but less solid information on 
numbers. As one significant step, Russia and the United States might agree to disclose the 
total number of their non-strategic nuclear warheads in storage and the number of 
warheads in the dismantlement queue. 
“Demating” Warheads from Delivery Systems. Russia has demated nuclear warheads 
from other non-strategic delivery systems. The sides might consider as a CBM formal 
statements affirming that nuclear warheads have been demated from their non-strategic 
delivery systems, and as a matter of policy, there is no intention of placing non-strategic 
nuclear warheads on delivery systems in the future. 
Security of Nuclear Warheads.  Russia and the United States could conduct a joint threat 
assessment of the risk of terrorists penetrating a storage site and gaining access to nuclear 
weapons; a joint security assessment of how site security might be improved to guard 
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against such risks; and resume practice of conducting recovery exercises in which Russia 
and the U.S./NATO forces work together to recover stolen nuclear weapons or fissile 
material. 
No Increase Commitment. As a minimal step, Russia and the United States might 
consider announcing that each will not increase the number of its non-strategic nuclear 
warheads. 
NATO’s Strategic Concept pledged to seek the relocation of Russian nuclear weapons away 
from NATO territory as one of the possible CBMs. I am sure that such a move on the part of 
Russia is practically not possible since it’s too costly and may reduce operational capabilities of 
the Russian Armed Forces, especially of the Russian Northern Fleet. 
Confidence-building measures on non-strategic nuclear weapons by themselves could build trust 
and momentum for broader progress on a much wider range of political and security issues.  
There is one sensitive moment in the context of a possible U.S.-Russian agreement on CBMs on 
NSNW which was very important for Russia before and is even more important against a 
background of the present level of NATO-Russia relations.  Transparency on this issue is very 
important to some European states. All the informal discussions concerning the question of 
transparency on non-strategic nuclear weapons show that United States is going to share 
information on Russian tactical nuclear weapons with its NATO allies. Such an approach is 
contrary to Russian official position based on reciprocity. So in the context of CBMs Russia will 
definitely insist on the involvement of France and the United Kingdom into the process or even 
NATO’s nuclear potential as a whole.
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Verification and Confidence Building Measures Related to Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons 
in Europe: Obstacles on the Way Forward1 
 
By Eugene Miasnikov 
Director 
Center for Arms Control, Energy & Environmental Studies 
The existing crisis in relations between Russia and the West has effectively postponed a chance 
of constructive discussion on verification and confidence-building measures (CBMs) of non-
strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) for an indefinite future. Unfortunately, Russia and the West 
continue to blame each other, as the situation in Ukraine deteriorates further, and there are not 
enough signs of de-escalation of the conflict. Nevertheless, it is important to understand what 
obstacles have to be surmounted in order to move the dialogue on NSNWs from the “dead stop”, 
provided that the sides resolve the Ukrainian crisis, and relations between Russia and the West 
hopefully return to a non-confrontational pass again. This paper makes an attempt to analyze the 
existing state of affairs and identify key problems to be resolved. 
Historical background 
Verification and confidence building measures with regard to non-strategic nuclear weapons 
(NSNWs) already have a rich and - to some extent – a successful history of implementation in 
the Euro-Atlantic region.2 The 1987 INF Treaty eliminated all ground-launched missiles having 
ranges between 500 and 5000 kilometers. According to the treaty, the missile front sections 
including the warheads without nuclear explosive charges have been destroyed at designated 
sites. In the late 1980-s the Soviet Union unilaterally withdrew all its non-strategic nuclear 
weapons from territories of the Warsaw Pact countries, and by early 1990-s – from the former 
Soviet republics. Though the primary reasons were changes in the Soviet military thinking as 
well as nuclear weapons safety and security concerns, these actions can be regarded also as 
confidence building measures. Reciprocally in the late 1980s, the United States cancelled or 
scaled back all planned modernization programs and sped up withdrawal of NSNWs from 
operational status. 
On September 27, 1991, U.S. President George H. W. Bush announced that the United States 
would withdraw all land-based tactical nuclear weapons from overseas bases and all sea-based 
tactical nuclear weapons from U.S. surface ships, submarines, and naval aircraft. A week later on 
October 5, 1991, President Gorbachev replied that the Soviet Union, too, would withdraw and 
eliminate non-strategic nuclear weapons. On January 29, 1992 as the Soviet Union collapsed, the 
Gorbachev’s pledge was confirmed by the Russian President Yeltsin. Though the Presidential 
                                                 
1 This is a draft publication that was prepared for a workshop sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS) at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP) in Vienna, Austria from 6-7 
October, 2014.  It is not to be cited or reproduced without the express permission of the author. 
2 For the purpose of this article the term “confidence building measure” (CBM) is defined as “collective or unilateral 
action in the military field by states to reduce tension and military confrontation, and also to prevent armed conflicts 
resulting from an incorrect assessment of each other’s military activities” (NATO-Russia Council Consolidated 
Glossary of Cooperation, Brussels-Moscow, 2011). The “non-strategic nuclear weapons” (NSNWs) are defined as 
U.S. and Russian nuclear warheads not associated with delivery systems that covered by the New START 
agreement. The term also includes dual-capable delivery systems, which these warheads are referred to. 
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nuclear initiatives did not assume any verification measures, there is a general understanding that 
most of proposed initiatives were successfully implemented.3 Russia, in particular, recently 
stated once more, that its stockpile of NSNWs has been reduced by 75% over the period of two 
decades.4 According to estimates of independent experts, the United States reduced more than 
90% of its inventory since 1991.5 
By the mid 1990s it became clear, that in order to cover non-strategic nuclear weapons by arms 
control agreements, there is a need to develop verification procedures for non-deployed 
warheads kept at storage places. Such a task was conducted in particular by a joint U.S.-Russian 
Working group, created as a result of the U.S. and Russia Presidential Summit decision in 
January 1994 to “consider… steps to ensure the transparency and irreversibility of reducing 
nuclear weapons.”6 Though the primary goal of the joint cooperation was dealing with strategic 
nuclear warheads slated for elimination, the results of the work had important implications for 
development of verification techniques to control NSNWs. Unfortunately, despite the progress 
achieved, the work had been stopped by the fall of 1995 because of the lack of interest on the 
Russian side. 
The subject re-surfaced later again in the agreement concluded during the Helsinki U.S.-Russia 
Presidential Summit of March 21, 1997. The two sides agreed that the number of basic elements 
of a future START III agreement should include “measures relating to the transparency of 
strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads and any 
other jointly agreed technical and organizational measures to promote the irreversibility of deep 
reduction …”. The Presidents proposed that in the context of START III negotiations their 
experts will explore, as separate issues, possible measures related to “… tactical nuclear systems, 
to include confidence-building and transparency measures.”  
Although both sides agreed with the transparency regime’s objectives and implementation 
mechanisms, they had differing approaches to defining its scope. 7 This divergence in approach, 
as well as the negative impact caused by NATO expansion, Kosovo war and the debate in the 
U.S. over the expediency of keeping the ABM Treaty, prompted the Russian side to leave the 
talks on these issues in 1999. 
                                                 
3 There are still some doubts among analysts, that Russia fulfilled its pledge to eliminate its ground-launched nuclear 
warheads (Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris, “Russian Nuclear Forces,” 2014, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
2014, March -April, Vol. 70(2) pp. 75–85).  
4 Interview of Mikhail Uliyanov, the Director of the Department for Security and Disarmament (currently, the 
Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control) of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Interfax 
Information Agency, January 31, 2014 
5 Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris, “Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons”, 2012, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
2014, March -April, Vol. 68(5) pp. 96–104 
6 Joint Statement by the President of the Russian Federation and the President of the United States of America on the 
Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Means of Their Delivery (Moscow, January 14, 1994) 
 
7 An excellent summary of US and Russian cooperation on developing transparency regime for nuclear warheads 
can be found in: Anatoly Diakov, “Nuclear Warheads and Weapon Grade Materials”, In “Nuclear Reset: Arms 
Reduction and Nonproliferation”, Ed. by Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, English version ed. by Natalia 
Bubnova, Carnegie Moscow Center, 2012, pp 233-256. 
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During the years of President George W. Bush administration, the discussion on NSNWs as well 
as on strategic arms was deadlocked, but the issue was revived again in the late 2000s. In 
particular, the U.S. side made an attempt to include it into the agenda of the New START 
negotiations. This attempt failed, but the Senate, in its Resolution of ratification on New START, 
stated that the United States should seek to initiate within one year, “negotiations with the 
Russian Federation on an agreement to address the disparity between the non-strategic (tactical) 
nuclear weapons stockpiles of the Russian Federation and of the United States and to secure and 
reduce tactical nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner.”8 In this connection the Obama 
administration made vigorous attempts to draw Russia into a dialogue on NSNWs. In parallel, 
NATO made efforts to encourage Russia to discuss transparency and confidence-building 
measures regarding NSNWs in Europe within the NATO-Russia Council.9  
Russia did not meet the offers from their western counterparts with great enthusiasm. Statements 
and interviews of the Russian Foreign Ministry officials every time stressed the attitude that 
remains unchanged for more than a decade: prior to beginning any substantive negotiations on 
NSNWs, all states should withdraw their nuclear weapons back to their national territory and 
irreversibly eliminate an option to deploy them abroad again rapidly (which means eliminating 
related infrastructure in Europe).10 Though some NATO members lobbied for withdrawal of U.S. 
nuclear bombs from Europe, the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago stated that “…NATO is 
prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for non-strategic nuclear weapons 
assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia…”11 
By the end of 2013 the discussion on NSNWs had been dead-locked. Russia did not reveal any 
interest to President Obama’s proposals made in Berlin in June, 2013 to reduce nuclear arsenals 
by one-third below the New START levels. Reportedly, ahead of the December meeting of the 
NATO-Russia Council, Russia declared that it was not interested in any discussion of nuclear 
confidence building.12 To a large extent such steps were motivated by the lack of progress in the 
bilateral discussion on ballistic missile defenses and intensification of the conflict between U.S. 
and Russian approaches toward solution of some other problems of international security. 
Obstacle one: Russia’s lack of interest in discussing NSNWs 
                                                 
8 Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to the Ratification of the Treaty Between the U.S.A.and Russian 
Federation on Measures of the Further Reduction and Limitation of  Strategic Offensive Arms (New START), 
December 22, 2010.  
9 Excellent summaries of these activities can be found in: Katarzyna Kubiak, “NATO and Russia Experiences with 
Nuclear Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures,” Working Paper FG03-WP No 02, SWP, Berlin, April 
2014; Oliver Meier and Simon Lunn, “Trapped: NATO, Russia, and the Problem of Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” 
Arms Control Today, January-February, 2014;  See also: Jacek Durkalec, Andrei Zagorski, “Options for 
Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures Related to Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Cost-
Benefit Matrix,” PISM-IMEMO Workshop Report, Warsaw, July 2014 
10 For one of the most recent statements see, in particular, the footnote 3. 
11 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, NATO, May 2012.  
12 Oliver Meier and Simon Lunn, 2014; op.cit. 
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Numerous reasons were mentioned why the NSNW issue has been deadlocked. The major reason 
seems to be the failure to awake any interest on the Russian side in spite of the West’s active 
efforts in this direction. 
In the late 2000s, when the campaign to initiate a dialog on NSNWs with Russia was started, 
such a need was motivated by clearly farfetched reasons as safety and security of non-deployed 
non-strategic weapons. An argument, in particular, was made that tactical nuclear weapons are 
more prone to a theft by terrorists compared to strategic warheads. This argument is at least a 
questionable one. 
After the New START Treaty entered into force, U.S. and European experts actively discussed 
covering non-deployed nuclear warheads (both strategic and tactical) by arms control measures. 
Supporters of this idea believed that Russia might accept a proposal to set up common limits on 
deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons by claiming that such an approach would resolve 
the problem of so called “breakout” or upload potential (non-deployed nuclear weapons placed at 
storage).13 After the New START reductions the United States are going to retain over 3000 
nuclear warheads ready to be deployed within days or weeks, twice as much as the permitted 
number of deployed nuclear warheads. Russia’s upload capability will be significantly smaller. 
It is true, that the upload potential issue became a strong argument in Russia against START-2 
Treaty in the middle of 1990-s and it caused a lot of criticism from the Treaty opponents. 
Compared to the START-2, the New START Treaty is even worse in terms of disparity in 
upload capabilities of the sides. However, there are very few voices in Russia who stress the 
importance of limiting the “breakout” potential. Therefore, it is not surprising that the idea has 
not created much of the anticipated Russian reaction. 
Further attempts to involve Russia into a serious dialogue on transparency and confidence 
building measures regarding NSNWs on the NATO-Russia track were not more convincing. 
Moreover, one has to admit that the NATO decision to link a possible withdrawal of U.S. nuclear 
bombs from Europe with Russian ‘reciprocal steps’ looks in itself as an attempt to find at least a 
one area of consensus among the members on the nuclear policy of the alliance.  
Russian officials always delicately stressed, that they were not avoiding the dialogue on NSNWs 
and were ready to discuss it in a context with other more urgent and priority issues (like limiting 
ballistic missile defenses, creating new architecture of security in Europe, ban on space weapons, 
etc). At the same time, the representatives of the Russian Defense Ministry were less 
ambiguous:14   
«… The political expediency of moving toward nuclear zero is declared, nobody 
questions that. However, what practical contribution to advancement of defense capacity 
and reducing the probability of conflicts in Europe can limits and transparency in the 
area of NSNWs bring? It would be helpful to us in the Defense Ministry to hear 
arguments on this respect…Every process of arms reductions should pursue three 
                                                 
13 Steven Pifer, “After New START: What Next?” Arms Control Today, December 2010 
14 Yevgeny Buzhinsky, Anatoly Dyakov, Alexander Kolbin and other, “The Future of Non-Strategic Nuclear 
Weapons in Europe: Opinions,” Index Bezopasnosti, N3-4, vol 18, Fall-Winter 2012, pp. 169-180 
 94 
 
objectives: reduce the probability of beginning of a conflict, reduce the cost of 
maintaining the Armed Forces and widen the area of security. From the point of view of 
widening the area of security, it is likely, that declarations and figures do promote this 
process. However, the first two points, the main and foreground, in my view, by no means 
depend on declarations of numbers. From the point of view of the Defense Ministry, our 
goal is to advance the defense capacity of our state, not to reduce it, or, at least, not to do 
anything harmful…”   
One may not exclude that after the relations between Russia and the West come back to normal, 
in some time, Russia will return to the previous formats of interactions with NATO as discussion 
of nuclear doctrines or joint safety and security exercises, which held in the past, and have been 
mostly symbolic by nature. However, it is unlikely that substantial progress in NSNWs area is 
possible without advances in the solutions of other problems of security that Russia prioritizes. 
Unlike during the late 1980-s- early 1990s when most of currently functioning arms control 
agreements had been achieved, Russia will certainly practice a more pragmatic approach. It is 
more realistic to expect, that on an initial phase, an agreement on some very limited (perhaps, 
even symbolic) transparency and confidence building measures with respect to NSNWs can be 
nothing more than a “makeweight” to a package of agreements in a wider area.  
Such an experience does already exist. For example, it is well known that the New START 
requires exchange of telemetry on ICBM and SLBM launches. Unlike to the verification 
mechanism of the “Old” START, the exchanged telemetry information has no technical role in 
verifying implementation of the New START provisions by the parties. Nevertheless, the 
Russian side made concessions in this regard. It understood that otherwise there would be a 
serious risk of failure of the Treaty ratification in the U.S. Senate. The telemetry information 
exchange became a “makeweight” to the New START agreement, and it contributed to the treaty 
approval, which finally succeeded by a light margin.  
Obstacle two: nuclear reductions and development of modern high-precision conventional 
weapons 
The second reason for the deadlock in resolving the NSNW issue is an existing fundamental 
contradiction between objective tendencies of diminishing nuclear potential (and its role), on one 
hand, and development of modern high precision arms – on the other. This contradiction affects 
both sides – the West, and Russia. 
NATO members, who are mostly concerned by Russian NSNWs and vigorously urge to link 
potential changes of alliance’s nuclear policy with Russian reciprocal measures on NSNW 
reductions or increasing transparency in this respect, first of all care about reassurance from 
other members of the alliance on their adherence to the Article V principle: “an attack on one is 
an attack on all”. They perceive the steps aimed at reductions of U.S. NSNWs in Europe as 
devaluing these assurances, and therefore insist on compensation – an enforcement of U.S. or 
NATO general purpose forces on the continent in parallel.15 On the other hand, Russia perceives 
                                                 
15 A more detailed analysis of this fundamental issue is given in: Laurens Hogebrink, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons 
and (The Lack of) Logic of Reciprosity: ‘Reassurance Within NATO’ vs. ‘Confidence Building with Russia’”,  
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strengthening NATO general purpose forces as a new emerging threat, which needs an adequate 
response, and, in any event, such a response does not seem to be reductions of Russia’s NSNWs 
or adapting transparency and CBMs in this area. Is this not a “Catch-22” situation? 
A typical example in this respect is the development of the European Phased Adaptive Approach 
(EPAA) program. The NATO members deploying the elements of the BMD system on their 
territory perceive the EPAA program as consolidating the alliance. The NATO states hosting 
U.S. nuclear weapons proposed a possible shift of consolidating roles from nuclear bombs to the 
BMD system under deployment. Russia at the same time considers EPAA as a threat to its 
strategic forces. When Russia was keeping its illusions about potential cooperation with U.S. on 
BMD (2010 - early 2011), it was not that allergic to discussing NSNWs. The impasse in the U.S-
Russian dialogue on BMD led to the complete loss of interest to the theme of NSNWs in the 
Russian Foreign and Defense Ministries.  
The fundamental contradiction between the tendencies mentioned above is applicable to Russia 
as well. Asked about the circumstances at what Russia would agree to cut its NSNWs, Vladimir 
Putin, and the Chair of the Russian government at the time, stated on February 24, 2012:16 
“…We are not going to give up any of the things that we need…We will only give up what 
encumbers us and does not bring any benefits. That is all. As for what we need and does 
not burden us, but on the contrary, offers certain guarantees, we are not going to give it 
up…”  
Few minutes before he spoke about new challenges on the way to further nuclear reductions: 
«...We see how technology is developing. Our partners really are ahead of us, especially 
in high precision weaponry. And these precision-guided weapons (I mean today’s 
capabilities and the power of modern munitions) combined with the time of delivery to an 
intended target become comparable with weapons of mass destruction though they are 
not technically WMDs. However, the result is not much different, and in the future, 
probably, will be no different from weapons of mass destruction. So we will eliminate 
nuclear weapons only when we have this kind of technology. And not a day earlier! No 
one should have any illusions about that! That’s the way it is...»  
If Russia develops and deploys such new high-precision conventional capabilities, NATO 
members will certainly perceive them as a new threat requiring a military response. 
It takes significant political will on both sides to overcome the fundamental problem posed by 
the tendencies of nuclear reductions and the development of high-precision conventional 
capabilities. In order to create that political will, substantial repair needs to be done to the 
relations between Russia and the West badly damaged during this year. However, not doing so 
                                                 
Discussion Paper, Dutch Pugwash Working Group on “Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Weapons Free Zones”, 
November 2013 
16 Prime Minister Vladimir Putin meets with experts in Sarov to discuss global threats to national security, 
strengthening Russia’s defences and enhancing the combat readiness of its armed forces, official transcript, February 
24, 2012, http://archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/18248/  
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threatens not only bilateral U.S.-Russian arms control regimes, but also multilateral agreements 
like the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
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The Status and Role of Technical Verification from the U.S. Perspective1 
By Nancy Jo Nicholas 
Associate Laboratory Director 
Los Alamos National Laboratory 
 
Abstract 
This technical presentation to an audience of policy and technical experts in the field of arms 
control monitoring and verification will discuss the state of verification science and technology 
that could apply to nonstrategic nuclear weapons: what tools are currently available, what's in the 
pipeline, what are the gaps. What does the science of the 21st century mean for the policy of the 
22nd century? 
 
It will provide examples from recent experience at Los Alamos National Laboratory developing 
and testing attribute verification systems with information barriers.  It will highlight three 
challenges to providing confidence—in the measurement, protection system, and results.  The 
presentation will focus on current work being done in the area of warhead monitoring, 
verification, and authentication.  
 
Los Alamos has long been recognized as the world’s first nuclear weapons laboratory. National 
and global security was the driving force for our creation and remains our most fundamental 
mission. We realize this requires us to not only maintain a safe and secure stockpile, but to 
support efforts that would reduce the need for such weapons and avoid unnecessary risks. We 
have a rich history of innovation in warhead safety and security and in the development of 
advanced nuclear technology. Los Alamos has played an active role in driving the science that 
underpins a wide array of international and multilateral nonproliferation and arms control 
agreements.   
 
Policy drivers for verification S&T 
The size of the U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons stockpiles has been reduced dramatically since 
the end of the Cold War. The Nuclear Posture Review Report of 2010 describes how the U.S. 
will continue to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons.2 Although there is significant 
discourse over exact numbers, the downward trend is likely to continue. Throughout this 
discourse, there is a wealth of information related to the military, geopolitical, diplomatic, 
budgetary, and technical challenges associated with a path towards very low numbers of nuclear 
weapons. This paper will focus on the verification challenge. 
 
                                                 
1 This is a draft publication that was prepared for a workshop sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS) at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP) in Vienna, Austria from 6-7 
October, 2014.  It is not to be cited or reproduced without the express permission of the author. 
2 http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf Nuclear Posture Review 




President Kennedy signed a treaty we couldn’t verify.  Policy makers set up a new strategic 
balance situation that required technology that didn’t exist yet. Five decades ago, technology 
developers responded quickly. The Vela Hotel series of satellites were first launched 50 years 
ago to begin monitoring the 1963 Limited Test 
Ban Treaty, which prohibits nuclear weapons 
tests "or any other nuclear explosion" in the 
atmosphere, outer space or under water.  
 
In the Prague speech, President Obama was clear 
in stating that the U.S. must not disarm 
unilaterally.3  Arms control policy without 
technology is impotent.  There is a symbiotic 
relationship between the technological challenges 
and policy that stimulates and motivates 
technology; it is not a static system. The goals of 
the original START treaty were met by physical destruction of weapons systems, but to remove 
the nuclear threat, something else is needed. For this new multilateral disarmament mission, new 
verification will be required, and that will require technical experts in front end R&D, confidence 
(and relationship) building measures and joint (or multilateral) verification experiments.  
 
Why is there a need for physics-based inspection techniques in nuclear arms control? Because a 
piece of plutonium is not like a tank or an airplane – verifying weapons components, or even 
weapons-useable material implies the need to provide confidence in things that can’t easily be 
seen.  These types of agreements may also require methods to confirm that nuclear warheads 
have been dismantled.  
 
Protecting classified data 
Any verification measurement performed on a nuclear warhead must satisfy two seemingly 
contradictory constraints. First and foremost, no classified information can be released. At the 
same time, the monitoring party must have confidence in the veracity of the measurement. 
Historical approaches to these warhead verification challenges can be grouped into two 
categories: attribute measurements and template matching. The attribute measurements approach 
is to demonstrate that classes of items have certain agreed-on characteristics. Many warhead 
characteristics are classified. However, comparing a classified characteristic with a threshold 
may render the result unclassified. For example, a mass of plutonium greater than an agreed-on 
threshold might be an acceptable warhead attribute.  This approach won’t definitively prove that 
a declared item is a nuclear warhead, but will demonstrate in an unclassified way that it contains 
weapons-useable material consistent with a warhead. 
 
The template matching approach builds on the attribute measurements concept by storing a 
classified set of attributes as a “template” of a warhead.  Then future measurements of declared 
items are compared to the template for verification as a warhead.  This approach may result in 
                                                 
3 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered 




faster verifications, but requires both trust in the initial template and storage of that highly 
classified information.   
 
Science-based tools being currently developed or tested  
Geopolitics and the dynamic security interests of nation states create an ever-evolving and 
complex set of challenges for international efforts to reduce nuclear risks. The resulting demands 
for scientific solutions are similarly dynamic and complex. Progress will depend on the creativity 
and dedication of our scientific and technological talent.4 A recent Defense Science Board (DSB) 
Task Force on assessing nuclear treaty monitoring and verification technologies highlighted the 
need to reinvigorate R&D efforts to advance verification and monitoring technologies.5 
 
At Los Alamos National Laboratory, our technical strategy for developing technology for arms 
control initiatives is divided into three primary areas:  
1. Deployment of equipment to address today’s verification challenges: Los Alamos 
developed the enrichment monitor, which was used to monitor the down-blending of 
HEU to LEU in Russian facilities to ensure that uranium was not diverted or lost in 
the process. 
2. Research and development of new technical options for verification: for example Los 
Alamos’s work in quantum cryptography provides a robust method for protecting 
sensitive data during monitoring activities. 
3. Innovative science to meet the verification needs of the future: for example, Los 
Alamos is developing low-temperature (cryogenic) microcalorimeter detectors for 
gamma-ray spectrometry and improved nuclear material measurements. 
 
Undoubtedly radiation detection measurements will be required for arms control treaties beyond 
new-START, for example to count ever smaller numbers of bombs and warheads deployed, in 
storage, or being dismantled––without revealing sensitive design information. Modeling and 
simulation play a pivotal role in the development and optimization of radiation detection 
systems. Models are needed to understand processes in the fabrication as well as in the operation 
of radiation detection systems.  Crystal growth processes, material surfaces, and charge transport 
in semiconductors are examples of objects and processes where modeling is crucial to improving 
the performance and fabrication of detectors.  An additional necessary component in the 
development and operation of radiation detection systems is Monte-Carlo simulations, which 
incorporate and are based on physics models of the instrument, the radiation, and the 
environment.    
 
However, the problem is larger than radiation detection. Some new technical tools are being 
considered to support an end-to-end approach for monitoring and verifying non-strategic nuclear 
weapons. Many of the tools currently being developed tested or evaluated as potential ways to 
cooperatively verify nonstrategic nuclear weapons under a future treaty focus on a specific 
                                                 
4 U.S.-Russian Nuclear Reductions After New START: Summary of a Workshop Exploring Next Steps February 
2013Workshop hosted by the American Physical Society Panel on Public Affairs and the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies. 
5 http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/NuclearMonitoringAndVerificationTechnologies.pdf  Defense Science Board 




element of the verification mission.  
 
1. Warhead measurement: neutron and gamma-ray based nondestructive assay 
2. Warhead verification: Attribute measurements with info barriers vs. template matching 
3. Facility monitoring: layered sensors, remote monitoring, persistent surveillance, muon 
radiography 
4. Data assessment: big data* analytics and crowd sourcing 
5. Data authentication: quantum cryptography 
6. Chain of custody: portal monitors, tags and seals, video surveillance 
(*Big data refers to collections of data sets so large and complex that it is impossible to process 
them with current tools.) 
 
The nonproliferation and arms control community would also benefit from a test bed to cover the 
full range of experimentation, testing, demonstration, exercises, and training with nuclear 
weapons and components.   
 
Lab-to-Lab engagement 
Successful technical verification and monitoring has its root in lab-to-lab engagement. The 
United States and Russia have a long history of cooperation on nonproliferation, nuclear security 
and nuclear energy.  In the wake of Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” initiative in 1953, purely 
scientific cooperation and exchanges were initiated. Starting in the late 1980s, U.S. and Russian 
scientists engaged in Joint Verification Experiments designed to build confidence in verification 
technologies to help ratify the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. The Joint Verification Experiments 
established the exchange visits of technical experts to classified facilities in each country.  The 
growing momentum led to the establishment of “Director’s Exchange” visits in early 1992, when 
the directors of Arzamas-16 (VNIIEF) and Chelyabinsk-70 (VNIITF) visited Los Alamos and 
Lawrence Livermore National Labs, followed by reciprocal visits to the Russian nuclear 
facilities.  These efforts resulted in the first lab-to-lab contract on joint experiments in pulsed-
power generation that took place in 1993, and the Lab directors signed an umbrella contract for 
additional lab-to-lab activities in 1994.  The remarkable pace of these interactions is largely 
attributed to the strong personal relationships between U.S. and Russian scientists and significant 
personal interactions between U.S. and Russian Laboratory Directors. However, due to 
retirements over the last decade in both U.S. and Russia, the number of professionals with 





Further progress on science and technology for warhead monitoring and verification will benefit 
from reinvigorating and expanding lab-to-lab engagement with Russia, and exploring 
engagement with other countries (e.g., China, India and possibly countries without nuclear 
weapons as well) on technical approaches to multi-lateral verification and monitoring. 
 
Conclusion 
The U.S. and Russia will likely engage in a number of treaty negotiations on nuclear weapons 
and nuclear material in the coming years. In treaty verification the job of scientists is to develop 
tools that provide confidence – to the stakeholders in our own countries and to some extent to the 
international community – that all parties are upholding treaty commitments. In all of these 
endeavors, monitoring verification technology will play a significant role. If technology is to 
fulfill this role, however, it will have to be aligned with needs of the policy makers. This will 
require a dialogue between the technology and policy communities.  Track-II forums promote 
such a dialogue in assessing the overall challenges and responses today, along with prospects for 
new approaches to the verification challenges of tomorrow.  
Authentication by Cooperative Design: The Russian-built Attribute Measurement System 
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